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ABSTRACT 
Moral Reasoning in Organizations: 
A Study of Men and Women Managers 
May 1987 
ROBBIN DERRY 
B.A. Dartmouth College 
M.B.A. University of Massachusetts 
Ph.D. University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Sidney Sufrin 
Current research in moral development suggests that 
there are two distinct modes of moral reasoning, one based 
on a morality of justice, the other based on a morality of 
care. The research presented here examines the kinds of 
moral reasoning used by managers in work-related conflicts. 
Twenty men and twenty women were randomly selected from the 
population of first level managers in a Fortune 100 
industrial corporation. In open-ended, semi-structured 
interviews each participant was asked to describe a 
situation of moral conflict in her or his work life. 
Demographic data on sex, age, religion, and length of time 
with the company were also collected. The interviews were 
coded with Lyons' methodology which categorizes all the 
considerations articulated by the interviewee in defining 
and resolving the conflict (Lyons, 1983). The hypotheses 
V 11 1 
tested in this research were: HI: There are two distinct 
modes of moral reasoning used in work-related conflicts; 
these are consistent with Gilligan's descriptions of 
morality as justice and morality as care; and H2: Morality 
as care is more frequently voiced by females and morality as 
justice is more frequently voiced by males in describing 
work-related moral conflicts (Gilligan, 1982). The results 
indicated a clearly preferred mode of moral reasoning among 
the participants who described moral conflicts. Nearly all 
of these predominated with a justice orientation. However, 
one third of the participants said they had never faced a 
moral conflict at work. There were no significant 
relationships between the demographic data and the 
occurrence of moral conflicts, or between the demographic 
data and the preferred mode of moral reasoning. These 
findings suggest that a correlation between gender and 
preferred mode (Gilligan, 1982) may be context specific. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . v 
ABSTRACT.viii 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION  1 
Overview  1 
Synopsis of Methodology . 6 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROBLEM DEVELOPMENT .... 10 
Literature Review  10 
Problem Development  36 
III. METHODOLOGY.39 
Data Gathering.39 
Data Analysis.49 
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS.57 
No Perceived Moral Conflicts at Work.58 
Dominant Use of the Justice Orientation .... 64 
Gender Differences and the Lack Thereof .... 72 
Summary of Hypotheses Testing . 78 
Conflicts With Whom About What.79 
Conceptions of Morality  83 
Professional Versus Personal Morality . 86 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION . 91 
Implications for Theory  91 
Implications for Practice  99 
Directions for Future Research . 102 
Reflections and Observations  107 
APPENDIX A: THE RESEARCH AGREEMENT  112 
APPENDIX B: THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE . 114 
APPENDIX C: THE PILOT STUDY.118 
APPENDIX D: TESTS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
FOR INDEPENDENCE. 120 
APPENDIX E: RESULTS OF THE MYERS-BRIGGS TYPE INDICATOR 125 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . 132 
X 
LIST OF TABLES 
1. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION . 41 
2. AGE OF PARTICIPANTS.59 
3. NUMBER OF YEARS EMPLOYED AT STENG.60 
4. FREQUENCY OF FEMALES AND MALES.60 
5. FREQUENCY OF MANAGERS AND NON-MANAGERS . 60 
6. FREQUENCY OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS . 61 
7. PERCENTAGE OF JUSTICE CONSIDERATIONS USED .... 65 
8. MALES AND FEMALES WITH JUSTICE REASONING SCORES . 66 
9. MANAGERS AND NON-MANAGERS WITH JUSTICE 
REASONING SCORES . 66 
10. JUSTICE REASONING SCORES WITH RELIGION . 66 
11. AGE OF PARTICIPANTS AND YEARS AT STENG.121 
12. AGE OF FEMALES AND AGE OF MALES.121 
13. AGE OF MANAGERS AND AGE OF NON-MANAGERS.121 
14. FEMALES AND MALES WITH YEARS AT STENG.122 
15. MANAGERS AND NON-MANAGERS WITH YEARS AT STENG . . 122 
16. MALES AND FEMALES WITH RELIGION.122 
17. MANAGERS AND NON-MANAGERS WITH RELIGION . 123 
18. MALES AND FEMALES WITH MANAGERS AND NON-MANAGERS . 123 
19. AGE WITH RELIGION.123 
20. YEARS AT STENG WITH RELIGION.124 
21. MYERS-BRIGGS SCORES WITH JUSTICE REASONING .... 130 
22. MYERS-BRIGGS SCORES MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS. 130 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
The focus of this research is moral reasoning in 
organizations. The term "moral reasoning" as used here 
describes the process by which individuals deal with moral 
conflicts. The process includes a definition and framing of 
the conflict, as well as an evaluation and resolution of the 
conflict by the individual. An underlying assumption is 
that different people experience moral conflicts 
differently, even when facing the same situation. This 
research examines how the moral reasoning process differs 
between individuals in work-related conflicts. 
The problem of how individuals reason about moral and 
ethical conflicts in a professional setting is addressed in 
this study. The importance of the problem is increasingly 
recognized in such contemporary cases as Ivan Boesky's web 
of insider trading, the Reagan administration’s decision to 
sell arms to Iran, covert support to repressive governments, 
employee secrecy about AIDS, and complex schemes of 
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kick-backs and bid-rigging. In many of these cases 
individuals faced ethical decisions in which professional 
goals, organizational pressures, and perhaps ambitions 
played a role. The professional obligations of the 
individual appear to be influential in the moral decision 
making process, but little is known of that process. This 
study aims to contribute to a greater understanding of moral 
and ethical reasoning within the context of organizations. 
In order to develop a better understanding of the 
process of moral reasoning, this research tests the thesis 
(Gilligan, 1982) that there are two distinct methods of 
reasoning about moral conflicts: one based on morality as 
justice, the other based on morality as care. Gilligan 
suggests that the two methods represent different moral 
orientations and that these are gender-related. This theory 
is supported by the empirical research of Lyons (1982), 
Gilligan et al. (1982), Langdale (1983), and Johnston 
(1985). These findings present evidence that while both men 
and women may use conceptions of morality as justice and 
morality as care, men more often articulate and use a logic 
of justice and more women articulate a logic of care in 
defining and resolving moral issues. The research presented 
here tests for these different moral orientations among 
managers of a large industrial organization. 
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The concept of morality as justice reflects the 
theories of Kant (1959) and Rawls (1971), and a 
deontological approach to moral philosophy. In this method 
of reasoning morality is based on individual rights, 
contractarian rules of society, and fair treatment. 
Kohlberg (1981) developed a theory of moral development 
based on this conception of morality as justice. His 
extensive research provides insights into changing 
perspectives on justice throughout different life stages. 
Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s theories will be explored more 
fully in Chapter Two. 
The concept of morality as care reflects a set of 
concerns that has been articulated less frequently or 
formally in moral philosophy. The concern of this approach 
is the responsibility of the individual to respond to 
another in the other’s terms, acting out of care for the 
other person (Gilligan, 1982). This is distinct from 
morality as justice in that it does not attempt to follow 
rules or insure equitable treatment. It focuses on 
responsiveness to another's needs. It also includes caring 
for oneself in a nurturing rather than a self-maximizing 
way. This approach to morality as care is perhaps closest 
to agapism in moral philosophy (Matthews, Goodpaster and 
Nash, 1985). 
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In this study the two different approaches to morality, 
justice and care, are considered in relation to the context 
of a corporate organization. Are different definitions of 
morality used in work environments? Do individuals 
selectively vary their moral reasoning processes depending 
on their personal or professional environment? Are the 
factors of sex, age, religious affiliation, length of time 
with the company, or position in the company related to the 
type of moral reasoning used by an individual? Is there a 
difference between personal morality and professional 
morality? These questions are directly addressed. 
Larger issues and questions that are the context of 
inquiry for this research are broad and far-reaching. How 
can people uphold individual ethics or morality within a 
large, diverse group? Can members of an organization 
exhibit moral responsibility both for themselves and the 
group? Do individual values shape the organization or does 
the organization somehow shape the values of its members at 
work? These questions are beyond the immediate scope of this 
inquiry, although answers from this study will help to 
address them. 
While the research presented here focuses on the 
individual as the moral agent (Velasquez, 1983), it does not 
assume that all moral responsibility in organizations should 
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be attributed to the individual members. The group of 
structured relationships within an organization is seen here 
as contributing to the moral reasoning of managers. The 
mutual responsibilities and expectations embedded in 
corporate roles are important considerations as the 
individual weighs his or her own values and attempts to 
distinguish between right and wrong courses of action. The 
structure of these relationships and the internal social 
context of the organization need to be examined in order to 
better understand moral responsibility and moral agency. 
Individuals are the decision makers, but they may choose to 
carry out particular actions only because the organizational 
backdrop demands them. 
What policies and pressures in the organization foster 
ethical and unethical behavior? Conceptual research has 
historically shaped the debate on moral agency. Empirical 
research is needed to document and describe how and why 
moral decisions are made in organizations. 
The research described here examines the kinds of moral 
reasoning used by managers in work-related conflicts, such 
as being told to give a dishonest performance appraisal, 
reporting a fellow buyer for taking bribes, terminating good 
employees, knowingly installing a faulty computer system, 
and discovering padded expense accounts. In these and other 
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described dilemmas a fundamental question is, "What is the 
moral conflict for you?" The responses to this and to 
related questions have been coded and categorized to better 
understand how individuals and organizations interact in the 
process of moral decision making. 
Synopsis of Methodology 
The research is survey research, based on tape recorded 
personal interviews of forty randomly selected first level 
managers in a Fortune 100 industrial firm. The information 
gathered pertains to two basic areas. The primary focus of 
the questions is a description of a moral conflict which the 
individual has faced in his or her working life, what issues 
raised the conflict, and what the individual considered in 
order to resolve the conflict. The secondary focus of the 
questions is the conceptual and practical definition of 
morality from the individual’s perspective and an 
understanding of whether personal and professional morality 
differ. 
Analysis of the interview data required transcription 
of the interview tapes. The several sections of the 
interviews were then coded using Lyons’ coding scheme 
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(Lyons, 1982). This methodology was developed specifically 
to interpret the open-ended interview questions which were 
adapted for this study. The process requires a 
categorization of each of the individual's articulated 
considerations in reasoning through the conflict and its 
resolution. The result is a total score for each interview 
indicating the strength of the predominant justice reasoning 
or the predominant care reasoning used in the dilemma 
discussion. 
Lyons' thesis (1982), in which the coding scheme was 
developed, empirically tested Gilligan's hypothesis for the 
first time. Her findings provided support for the theory 
that the two moral orientations of justice and care are 
gender related. The coding scheme was also used by Gilligan 
et al . ( 1982) in "The Contribution of Women's Thought to 
Developmental Theory." Subsequent research has compared 
data using both Lyons' and Kohlberg's coding methods 
(Langdale, 1983), and used the conceptualization of the 
Lyons' coding scheme to interpret children's responses to 
moral dilemmas in fables (Johnston, 1985). Counts (1987) 
conducted a study similar to the research presented in this 
paper, sampling high school principals and superintendents 
as the population of study. The interview format and coding 
scheme developed by Lyons were utilized in that research as 
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well. This methodology permits the examination of moral 
reasoning in real-life situations as experienced by the 
participant. 
Demographic information was gathered on age, sex, 
religious affiliation, and length of time in the employment 
of the company. These demographic data were tested for 
correlation with the moral reasoning scores obtained from 
the coded interviews. This correlational analysis allowed 
an examination of whether any of these demographic factors 
was significantly related to the moral reasoning orientation 
of the respondents. 
In addition, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator was 
administered to each participant. The Myers-Briggs is a 125 
item questionnaire on behavior, attitudes, and preferences. 
Whe'n coded it describes the respondent on four continue 
which identify the dominant Jungian personality type. These 
i.ndividual types were tested for correlation with the 
analyzed interview data. 
The Myers-Briggs questionnaire was included in this 
study for methodological and theoretical reasons. It is a 
widely used and respected instrument in personality 
f 
assessment, and it is easily administered and coded. If 
there is evidence that the Myers-Briggs types are strongly 
related to the justice or the care orientation, this might 
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provide a first step in developing alternative measures of 
the justice and care modes of moral reasoning. From a 
theoretical perspective, research on the Myers-Briggs offers 
insight into patterns of thinking and learning which might 
further explain different conceptions of morality if 
significant relationships were found between the 
hypothesized modes of moral reasoning and the Myers-Briggs 
types. 
In addition, there are several questions in the 
interview schedule, the answers to which were not formally 
coded. These are questions about the difference between 
personal and professional morality, about the individual’s 
definition of personal success, and about conflicts between 
individual responsibility and responsibility to the 
organization. This information was gathered to build a 
descriptive context for the sample interviewed. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROBLEM DEVELOPMENT 
Literature Review 
Research on the moral reasoning of managers bridges two 
distinct fields of theory: moral agency and moral 
development. Contemporary views in these two fields are 
presented in the first section of this chapter, the review 
of literature. In the second section, the problem 
development, these fields are brought together in 
formulating the research problem. This problem is the basis 
of the empirical research presented and analyzed in the 
subsequent chapters. 
The study of moral agency as it relates to business 
ethics raises the question of whether the corporation as a 
whole, the individual manager, or both should be considered 
as the locus of moral responsibility. Although individuals 
may be the moral actors, they are carrying out their roles 
and obligations within the corporation, rather than acting 
independently. 
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A corporation is often described as a paper entity, a 
legal creation, not the equivalent of a person (Velasquez, 
1983; DeGeorge, 1981). Does this so-called body have 
values? Is moral responsibility collective or individual? 
Clearly a corporation can not act separately from the 
actions of its individual members, but can the moral 
responsibility of a firm be reduced to that of its members? 
In terms of legal and social implications, the 
determination of moral responsibility is a highly 
significant question. Since the answer to that question 
leads to the assignment of penalties for immoral decisions 
in organizations, it is critical to an understanding of why 
managers make the decisions they do in situations of moral 
conflict at work. 
The study of moral development of individuals has 
emerged from the field of cognitive development in 
psychology and education. Moral development has 
traditionally examined perceptual stages through which 
individuals pass as their ability to reason about moral 
issues matures. Kohlberg (1981) developed a stage theory of 
moral reasoning in the late fifties which defined the field 
for two decades. However, Gilligan’s hypothesis (1977), 
that there are two distinct modes of moral reasoning, 
challenged prior assumptions about the universality of 
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Kohlberg’s stages and called for a reassessment of the 
field. Gilligan's description of two methods of moral 
reasoning, justice and care, provides the framework for the 
research presented here. Kohlberg’s theory, Gilligan's 
challenge, and consequent empirical research are discussed 
as the context from which this research emerged. 
The question of moral agency and the current challenges 
in the field of moral development are bridged by the 
examination of moral reasoning of managers in work-related 
conflicts. The conceptual and empirical findings of these 
two fields are the groundwork reviewed in this chapter. 
Moral Agency 
To whom should moral responsibility be assigned within 
a corporation? Is a corporation a moral agent as well as a 
legal agent? Can a corporation have a moral conscience? 
Who makes moral decisions within a large group? Do 
individuals act independently or collectively? Can 
collective decisions about ethical issues be attributed to a 
group morality? These are the questions raised by a study 
of moral agency in business. Several positions have been 
debated in the literature (Velasquez, 1983; Goodpaster and 
Matthews, 1982; Donaldson, 1982; DeGeorge, 1981; French, 
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1979). They are presented here as theoretical background to 
understanding how and why individual managers reason about 
moral conflicts in the ways which are described in the 
empirical research. 
The Hand of Management. Goodpaster and Matthews (1982) 
argue that there are three meanings attributed to the word 
"responsibility". The three meanings are broadly: someone 
to blame, something is to be done, or some kind of 
trustworthiness can be expected. These include 1) a causal 
implication, that someone was responsible for an occurence 
in that they caused it to happen, i.e. accountability; 2) 
rule following, adherence to expected social norms, such as 
a parent’s responsibility to a child or a doctor’s to a 
patient; 3) decision making, an individual’s independent 
thought processes are considered to be trustworthy and 
reliable, allowing the proper factors to be influential. 
The distinguishing characteristic of moral 
responsibility, it seems to us, lies in this third 
sense of the term. Here the focus is on the 
intellectual and emotional processes in the 
individual’s moral reasoning . . . .What, then, 
characterizes the processes underlying the judgment of 
a person we call morally responsible? (Goodpaster and 
Matthews, 1982, p. 133-134). 
Goodpaster and Matthews’ answer is twofold: respect and 
rationality. Respect is taking other people into account, 
treating others as ends in themselves, a special awareness 
of the effects of one’s decisions and policies on others. 
14 
special in that it is beyond seeing others simply as 
instrumental to one's own purposes, taking their needs and 
interests seriously, not merely as resources. This is 
consistent with Kant's categorical imperative (Kant, 1959). 
Rationality includes the important features of rational 
decision making: 
...lack of impulsiveness, care in considering 
consequences and alternatives, clarity about goals and 
purposes and attention to details of implementation 
(p. 134). 
Given these criteria of individual moral reasoning, can 
a parallel be made between corporate decision making and 
individual decision making, which attributes morality to 
organizations on the same basis? Goodpaster and Matthews 
answer in the affirmative. A brief review of two dominant 
theories of restraints and guidelines for corporations is 
useful before examining their proposal. 
Currently there are two major alternative perspectives 
on what controls organization goals and decisions 
(Goodpaster and Matthews, 1982). These are articulated by 
Friedman and Galbraith. Friedman argues that corporations 
are properly controlled by an invisible hand, that of the 
marketplace (1970). A freely competitive market will 
dictate goals, strategies, and corporate behavior. Any 
inclusion of individual or small group values in the 
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corporate purpose is an intrusion which distracts and 
betrays the responsibility of the managers and employees to 
the owners of the corporation. An organization should be 
deliberately amoral. A systematic morality, the highest 
common good, will result from following the dictates of the 
free market, rather than the dictates of any particular 
organization, or managers within the organization. 
Galbraith argues, in contrast, that the hand of 
government is the source of rational, legal, and moral 
control of organizations (1967). Law and the political 
processes should properly regulate the goals of business. 
The custodians of the public purpose should determine the 
common good, private managers should be ultimately 
controlled by public managers. While moral responsibility 
resides in the government, the responsibility of the 
corporation is limited to political and legal obedience. 
Goodpaster and Matthews (1982) propose a third 
alternative which attributes moral responsibility to both 
the corporation and the individuals within the corporation. 
This position they call "The Hand of Management". In 
contrast to Friedman’s and Galbraith’s positions, both of 
which locate the responsibility and conscience in the 
systems surrounding the corporation, Goodpaster and Matthews 
argue for a view of corporate responsibility that focuses on 
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what they consider the thought process of the organization 
itself. Drawing on their criteria of rationality and 
respect as the basis for moral reasoning of an individual, 
they project this responsibility to organizations. 
While claiming the logic of this projection, they 
confront the question of moral agency. "Is it meaningful to 
apply moral concepts to actors who are not persons but who 
are instead made up of persons (p. 135)?" Their response is 
that if organizations can act like a person in some ways 
then it is a reasonable expectation that it should act like 
a person in other ways. Individual actions for the 
corporation become official actions of the whole group. 
Certain members of the organization can articulate policy 
which are adopted as organizational decisions. The people 
within the group can act as a unit, and be addressed as a 
unit. 
If we can say that persons act responsibly only if 
they gather information about the impact of their 
actions on others and use it in making decisions, we 
can reasonably do the same for organizations.... Hence, 
corporations that monitor their employment practices 
and the effects of their production processes and 
products on the environment and human health show the 
same kind of rationality and respect that morally 
responsible individuals do. Thus, attributing actions, 
strategies, decisions, and moral responsibilities to 
corporations as entities distinguishable from those who 
hold offices in them poses no problem (Goodpaster and 
Matthews, 1982, p. 135). 
Although Goodpaster and Matthews acknowledge numerous 
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objections to their "Hand of Management" theory, they 
conclude that the moral responsibility of individual 
managers and of the corporation as a whole should be seen as 
congruent (p. 138). Their conclusion invites pursuit of 
increased understanding of individual responsibility within 
organizations, and of the projection of respect and 
rationality to the corporation as a whole. The principle of 
moral projection needs to be brought into the balance with 
market and governmental regulation. It is not a substitute 
for laws or markets, but an urgent proposal that the 
standards applied to individual thought processes to 
determine acceptable levels of responsibility be equally 
applied to organizational decision making. 
The Organizational View vs. The Moralistic View. In an 
article entitled "Can Corporations have Moral 
Responsibility?" Richard DeGeorge addresses the question of 
moral agency (DeGeorge, 1981). He suggests that there are 
two views of collective moral responsibility which he calls 
the Organizational View and the Moralistic View. His 
analysis begins with a contrast of these two perspectives 
and concludes with a formulation of five different models of 
how moral responsibility could be assigned within an 
organization. 
In the Organizational View the corporation is seen as a 
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legal entity, created for the purposes of profit, 
production, and the provision of services. Its structural 
organization and goals are focused on these limited tasks. 
It is not a natural person and certainly cannot act on its 
own. The individual employees and managers who act for the 
corporation are acting only as agents. They are not acting 
as private persons with individual purposes and goals. They 
do not impose their priorities on the corporation. If they 
steal from the corporation, or manipulate it for their 
private ends, or in any way act contrary to its goals and 
purposes, they are acting as individual agents and incur 
personal liability. However, as long as they act in ways 
that are consistent with their job and organizational goals, 
they are fulfilling their responsibility. 
According to the Organizational View, the 
organization's responsibility to society is a legal one. 
Any discussion of moral responsibility is senseless. The 
organization is simply not a moral agent. It is a legal 
entity, created to fulfill legal purposes. As long as the 
products and processes used by the company are within legal 
restrictions, there is no need for a discussion of the 
morality of working conditions, or the morality of the 
product quality, or of the use of the products within 
society. Moral responsibility can not be assigned to either 
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the organization or individuals legitimately working on its 
behalf . 
The Moralistic View finds these conclusions 
unjustifiable. Individuals may be working on behalf of the 
organization but they do not cease to be moral agents by 
virtue of their professional roles. To offer moral immunity 
to corporations and their managers and employees is to 
equate law and ethics. And further, it exempts corporations 
from the moral evaluation and criticism we apply to 
individuals. The Moralistic View claims that corporations 
should be held morally responsible. But, DeGeorge points 
out, clearly corporations cannot be seen as identical to 
individual moral agents. Corporations do not feel shame, or 
emotions, nor do they have a conscience to guide and judge 
actions. Thus the question is not so much "Can the 
corporation be seen as morally responsible?" but "How should 
moral responsibility be assigned to the corporation and the 
individuals in it?" "Who should be held accountable and how 
should punishment be rendered justly?" Since it is proper to 
speak of corporate actions then it is proper to speak of 
immoral corporate actions even though the corporation does 
not have corporate feelings. 
DeGeorge proposes five different ways of assigning 
responsibility for corporate actions. The first model 
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assigns full individual responsibility to all organizational 
members who are involved in an action or decision. If the 
board of directors makes a decision to close down a plant, 
then each of the members of the board shares in the 
collectively held but individually born responsibility for 
the moral implications of that action for the community and 
the employees. Each member has full responsibility. A 
variant on this model would hold every member of the 
organization fully responsible, whether or not they were 
involved in the decision. By virtue of membership in the 
organization, they are held accountable for all corporate 
actions. 
The second model assigns partial responsibility to all, 
or the involved, members of the firm. Responsibility would 
be proportional to the number of people involved in the 
decision, or the number of people who were in favor of the 
action taken, or to the number of people in the organization 
as a whole. There are numerous variations on this model. 
Both the first and second models attempt to break down all 
corporate responsibility into component individual 
responsibility. 
The third and forth models attribute responsibility to 
both the corporation as a whole and the individual members, 
either partially or fully. The fifth model assigns all 
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responsibility to the corporation as a unit and none to 
individuals. 
In outlining these variations DeGeorge acknowledges 
that such an analysis raises more questions about moral 
responsibility than it answers. But his intention is to 
focus attention on the reality that society does critically 
evaluate the actions of corporations and that corporations 
are not immune to moral scrutiny. Although legal and 
organizational theorists may suscribe to the Organizational 
View which argues that corporations are not moral agents, in 
fact it is widespread practice to assess the moral rightness 
or wrongness of corporate behavior within our society. 
People's lives both within and outside the corporation are 
powerfully affected by corporate decisions. Someone or some 
group must bear responsibility for the effects of those 
decisions. 
Therefore, DeGeorge articulates a position in favor of 
the Moralistic View, while highlighting the need for ongoing 
clarification of the locus of moral responsibility within 
the organization. The legal precedents offer some guidance 
in understanding blame and responsibility for illegal 
actions within a corporation. Similarly, moral 
responsibility can be more precisely defined and assigned. 
Once a corporation acknowledges and accepts its moral 
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responsibility to society as v;ell as to its own members, it 
can begin to face the questions of who shall carry the 
responsibility, how to communicate expectations of moral 
responsibility to managers and employees, what moral 
responsibility means in terms of company operations, and how 
to reorganize to increase individual awareness of personal 
moral responsibility in professional roles. DeGeorge argues 
that this kind of awareness will increase the level of 
pressure to consider more carefully the actions of the 
corporation from a moral point of view. 
Corporate Intention. Peter French draws an analogy 
between individual morality and corporate morality in 
addressing the issue of moral agency (French, 1979). He 
points out that in assessing individual responsibility a 
major factor considered is the intent of that person. 
According to French, normally people are not held morally 
responsible for unintentional acts. In order to make sense 
of the idea of corporate moral responsibility, corporate 
intention must be defined. 
What needs to be shown is that there is sense in 
saying that corporations and not just the people who 
work in them, have reasons for doing what they do. 
Typically, we will be told that it is the directors, or 
the managers, etc., that really have the corporate 
reasons and desires, etc., and that although corporate 
actions may not be reducible without remainder, 
corporate intentions are always reducible to human 
intentions (French, 1979, p. 212). 
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In pursuit of distinguishing corporate intention, 
French coins the Corporate Internal Decision (CID) 
structure. The CID structure has two components which can 
be analyzed for intention. One is an organizational chart 
which indicates the levels and flows of responsibility 
within the hierarchy. French refers to this as the "grammer 
of corporate decision making". The second is the formal and 
informal corporate policy: the beliefs, principles and goals 
of the organization. 
Following the CID structure then, a decision is an 
intentional corporate decision, if it is made in accordance 
with the corporate chart, and if it is consistent with 
corporate policy. An important aspect of French's theory is 
that the intent of the corporation is not the same as the 
intentions of individual decision makers. The corporation's 
intentions are not reducible to the intentions of the 
component members. It literally incorporates these 
individual intentions, and in doing so takes on a distinct 
identity as a moral agent. 
This much seems to me clear: we can describe many 
events in terms of certain physical movements of human 
beings and we also can sometimes describe those events 
as done for reasons by those human beings, but further 
we can sometimes describe those events as corporate and 
still further as done for corporate reasons that are 
qualitatively different from whatever personal reasons, 
if any, component members may have for doing what they 
do. Although further elaboration is needed, I hope I 
have said enough to make plausible the view that we 
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have good reason to acknowledge the non-eliminatable 
agency of corporations (French, 1979, p. 215). 
French is arguing that the corporation is in some 
instances a moral person, with intentions and actions of its 
own, different from the intentions and actions of the 
individual members of the firm. With this perspective he 
would make use of DeGeorge's third or fourth models, which 
assign responsibility to both the organization as a whole, 
and the involved members of the organization. Certainly 
there is legal precedent in support of French’s view. 
White-collar crime, such as the E. F. Hutton check-kiting 
scheme, has frequently resulted in fines and reprimands to 
the company, rather than punishment of individul 
participants. In the Boesky case, which implicated 
executives in several prominent brokerage houses in 
elaborate webs of insider trading, the individuals were 
fined and barred from practice. This assignment of penalty 
is consistent with French’s argument since the executives 
were not acting in concert with corporate policy or 
intention. They were acting as individuals to maximize 
their own good by exploiting the company’s trust and 
resources, thus the organization should not be held morally 
responsible for these actions. 
A Reductive View. Velasquez (1983) counters French 
contending that corporations are fictitious entities, a 
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corporation does not act separately from the actions of 
individual members, and therefore a corporation cannot be 
morally responsible for the acts or intentions of its 
members. According to Velasquez, moral responsibility 
should be attributed to those members of the group who 
contributed to or performed the action in question, or 
knowingly refrained from preventing such an action when it 
was within their ability to do so. It is the individuals, 
not the organization, who are the moral agents. 
Velasquez insists that he is not attempting to "reduce" 
a corporation to its members, and that he fully recognizes 
the system of relationships and constitutive rules which 
define an organization beyond a simple collection of 
individuals. While denying "a reductive view of corporate 
acts", he argues for "a reductive view of moral 
responsbility" (Velasquez, 1983, p. 18). 
In considering the question of moral agency, there are 
numerous alternative positions. In this section we have 
considered the arguments of Goodpaster and Matthews, 
DeGeorge, French, and Velasquez. All but Velasquez are in 
favor of assigning moral responsibility to the organization, 
whether it be projected on a model of individual 
responsibility, or shared with individuals participating in 
the decision making, or attributed on the basis of corporate 
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intent, similar to individual intent. Velasquez believes 
that a blurring of the difference between individual 
responsibility and corporate responsibility results in a 
corporate veil of protection around the individual decision 
maker. In order to deter corporate wrongdoing, he argues 
that blame must be placed directly on the individuals who 
acted knowingly and intentionally. 
Individual Within The Organization. It would seem that 
moral responsibility can indeed be attributed to both the 
individual and the organization. The position on moral 
agency held by the author and underlying the empirical 
research presented in this paper is that responsibility 
should be assigned primarily to individual decision-makers. 
But in many cases a decision within an organization is 
sufficiently complex as to not be traceable to a few 
individuals. A decision is often premised on what is 
standard practice within the corporation, and for this 
reason the organization as whole should be responsible since 
it fosters certain behaviors and decisions in its members. 
However individuals must take the burden of 
responsibility for their own decisions and not escape with 
the excuse of having acted under the guise of following the 
rules, regardless of how corrupt the rules are. The 
pressures for following the rules are . ometimes enormous. 
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critical aspect of moral decision making, and moral 
responsibility taking, is for individuals to consider and 
weigh the implications of their choices for their own lives, 
and the lives of those touched by their decisions. This is 
a broader and harder process than following rules defined by 
others. 
The question of who is morally responsible has been a 
major focus of research on moral decision making in 
organizations. It has been debated from philosophical, 
conceptual, and theoretical perspectives. This research 
contributes empirical data to the debate. It asks who makes 
moral decisions in organizations, how do they make them, and 
how do they think about the organization in making moral 
choices about work-related issues? 
The discussion has been carried on by philosophers, by 
/ 
whom data may be considered "merely empirical", not a worthy 
contribution to scholarly theorizing. But building a field 
of business ethics research demands the integration of the 
philosophers* normative views and the management theorists’ 
pragmatic views. This research evaluates the theories of 
moral agency and moral development in the dynamic context of 
a major corporation. 
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Moral Development 
Stage Theory. The field of moral development has been 
long dominated by the research of Lawrence Kohlberg (1981). 
As early as 1958 Kohlberg conceptualized a psychological 
stage theory of moral development. The following twenty 
years were spent empirically validating and refining the 
proposed stages. This validating process included a 
longitudinal study in which the subjects of Kohlberg’s 
original dissertation research were reinterviewed every 
three years. Kohlberg created hypothetical moral dilemma 
scenarios as the basis of the interviews that probed and 
assessed the participants' moral reasoning. One of 
Kohlberg's most famous dilemmas is The Heinz Dilemma: 
In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad 
disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug 
that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form 
of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently 
discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the 
druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him 
to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 
for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's 
husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the 
money, but he could get together only about $1000, 
which was half of what it cost. He told the druggist 
that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it 
cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, 
"No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money 
from it." Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's 
store to steal the drug for his wife (Kohlberg, 1981, 
p.l2). 
In Kohlberg's semi-structured interviews, this dilemma 
29 
is followed by questions such as "Should the husband have 
done that?" , "Was it right or wrong?", "Would it be wrong 
if he didn’t steal it?" The participants' answers to these 
and other questions are scored to render them comparable 
(Colby et al., 1983). 
By reinterviewing the same subjects every three years 
in a twenty year longitudinal study, Kohlberg was able to 
examine patterns and changes in the ways the subjects 
reasoned about a variety of hypothetical dilemmas. His 
psychological stage theory of moral development suggests 
that there are six universal and invariable stages through 
which individuals progress as their moral reasoning develops 
from infancy to adulthood. How far any individual 
progresses through the stages is a result of many factors 
including education and experience. 
Kohlberg’s stages are: 
Stage 1. Punishment and Obedience. 
This stage is characterized by the avoidance of 
punishment and deference to power. 
Stage 2. Instrumental Exchange. 
Right actions are seen as those which instrumentally 
satisfy one’s own needs and occasionally the needs of 
others. 
Stage 3. Interpersonal Conformity. 
Right behavior is that which is seen as good or nice by 
others. There is concern for helping and pleasing 
others, and earning approval. 
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Stage 4. Social System Maintenance. 
This stage displays a regard for authority, fixed 
rules, obligations and duties, and maintaining the 
social order for its own sake. 
Stage 5. Social Contract. 
Right action is defined by individual rights relative 
to what has been defined and agreed upon within 
society. There is an awareness of relativity in 
personal values and in social change, but also a 
concern to support the democratic and legal processes 
for social utility. 
Stage 6. Universal Ethical Principles. 
Ethical principles, such as the Golden Rule, and the 
categorical imperative, provide the basis for decisions 
of conscience. These principles are abstract, as 
opposed to concrete (e.g. the Ten Commandments), and 
demonstrate universality, consistency, and respect for 
dignity of individuals and the value of human life. At 
this stage, right is defined by these self-chosen 
ethical principles (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 17-18). 
The stage theory rank orders different types of moral 
reasoning into these levels which Kohlberg argued were 
sequentially "higher" in terms of individual cognitive 
development. His hypothetical dilemmas and stage theory 
provided the basis for continuing research into various 
cultures. In such places as Taiwanese and Malaysian 
villages Kohlberg translated his dilemmas into stories that 
had local significance, and through interpreters, questioned 
children, adolescents, and adults about their perception of 
the moral dilemmas. His extensive studies led him to 
conclude that although the specific content of moral 
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thinking varies between cultures, the form of moral 
development and progression through the stages is universal 
and invariant (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 116). 
In 1977 Carol Gilligan challenged the field to consider 
the sex bias inherent in Kohlberg’s model (Gilligan, 1977). 
The longitudinal sample which had given Kohlberg his 
critical model-building data was composed of eighty-four 
males. Women, when measured on Kohlberg’s scale, rarely 
reached the higher stages (Holstein, 1976), and most often 
seemed to demonstrate stage three reasoning, that of helping 
and pleasing others. 
Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) imply that only if 
women enter the traditional arena of male activity 
[outside the home] will they recognize the inadequacy 
of this moral perspective and progress like men toward 
higher stages where relationships are subordinated to 
rules (stage four) and rules to universal principles of 
justice (stages five and six) (Gilligan, 1982, p. 18). 
In conducting interviews for a project with Kohlberg, 
Gilligan had found what she subsequently called "a different 
voice,” the perspective, voiced more frequently by women, 
that morality was not defined by justice, fairness, or 
universal rights, as Kohlberg argued. Instead this 
perspective described a morality based on care, on 
responsibility to others, on the continuity of 
interdependent relationships. 
When one begins with the study of women and 
derives developmental constructs from their lives, the 
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outline of a moral conception different from that 
described by Freud, Piaget, or Kohlberg begins to 
emerge and informs a different description of 
development. In this conception, the moral problem 
arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than 
from competing rights and requires for its resolution a 
mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative 
rather than formal and abstract. This conception of 
morality as concerned with the activity of care centers 
moral development around the understanding of 
responsibility and relationships, just as the 
conception of morality as fairness ties moral 
development to the understanding of rights and rules 
(Gilligan, 1982, p. 19). 
Gilligan described this perspective as a morality of 
care and argued that it was a distinct moral orientation, 
not merely one of Kohlberg’s stages of moral development. 
She believed that this orientation resulted in clearly 
different reasoning and ways of resolving moral conflict 
situations. 
Kohlberg’s response to Gilligan was to acknowledge the 
importance of recognizing the concept of morality which 
focuses on special relationships and obligations, but to 
deny that it was a distinct moral orientation. He saw it as 
a supplement rather than an alternative to justice solutions 
(Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer, 1983, p. 21). 
We believe that Gilligan's distinction between a 
morality of care and a morality of justice is a 
distinction held in the minds of all human 
beings.... However, these two senses of the word moral 
do not represent two different moral orientations 
existing at the same level of generality and validity. 
V/e see justice as both rational and implying an 
attitude of empathy. It is for this reason that we 
make the following proposal: i.e. that there is a 
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dimension along which various moral dilemmas and 
orientations can be placed. Personal moral dilemmas 
and orientations of special obligation, as we have just 
discussed them, represent one end of this dimension and 
the standard hypothetical justice dilemmas and justice 
orientation represent the other end (Kohlberg, Levine, 
and Hewer, 1983, p. 24-25). 
Thus within his primary focus on justice, Kohlberg 
expanded his conception of morality to include obligations 
based on special relationships. Gilligan maintained that a 
primary concern with morality as care often extended beyond 
ties of family and close friendships. She and her 
colleagues argued that this orientation followed a logic of 
reasoning that was quite different from that of the justice 
orientation (Lyons, 1982). While Kohlberg suggested that 
Gilligan's morality of care was insufficient to resolve 
certain justice dilemmas, Gilligan emphasized that what 
constituted a moral dilemma varied between orientations. 
According to Gilligan, the very process of defining a moral 
conflict was critical to understanding an individual's moral 
reasoning (Gilligan et al., 1982) 
Gilligan suggested that Kohlberg's hypothetical 
dilemmas presupposed a definition of morality as justice and 
were biased towards justice-based resolutions. She felt 
that only as respondents were encouraged to define morality 
from real life situations in which they felt a moral 
conflict would a researcher obtain an accurate assessment of 
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the respondents’ definitions and resolutions of moral 
issues. These would contrast with the hypothetical dilemmas 
in which the interviewee is ’’given" a dilemma situation. 
Alternative Moral Orientations. Gilligan, Langdale, 
Lyons, and Murphy (1982) developed a research interview as 
the basis for examining the different types of moral 
reasoning proposed by Gilligan. The open-ended, 
semi-clinical interview pioneered by Piaget was adapted as a 
research tool (Piaget, 1965). It is described by Lyons as 
follows: 
The interview is designed to permit an interaction 
between two people that makes it possible to present as 
fully as possible how one of them thinks about some 
important issues.... Thus the set of questions put to a 
person in an interview is designed to allow the person 
to present his or her thinking and to elaborate the 
ways that issues are constructed and resolved. That 
purpose is achieved in the interaction between two 
people. For the interviewer, two things are necessary: 
(1) to listen, that is, to follow the train of thinking 
of the person interviewed; and, (2) to have - as Piaget 
suggests - some directing hypothesis to guide the 
probing (Lyons, 1984, pp. 2-4). 
This interview format was used to explore the 
hypothesis that men and women define moral issues 
differently and use different bases on which to reason them 
out (Gilligan, 1977, 1982). Langdale (1983) and Lyons 
(1983) found empirical results which verified Gilligan’s 
thesis that two distinct moral orientations were 
significantly related to gender. In both studies the care 
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orientation predominated in female thinking and the justice 
orientation predominated in male thinking. Lyons offered a 
further conceptualization of morality that encompassed the 
individual’s view of self in relation to others. Langdale’s 
study was designed to consider the relationship of age to 
primary moral orientation but no significant relationship 
was found. Johnston (1985), using fables as dilemmas to 
study the moral orientations of adolescents, found that boys 
and girls were able to articulate both care and justice as 
alternative solutions to the dilemmas posed. In their 
initial spontaneous responses the boys focused primarily on 
justice solutions, while the girls spontaneously offered 
care solutions in one fable and justice solutions in the 
other fable. These findings suggest that the use of 
different moral orientations is gender related but also 
context specific. None of the above studies suggests an 
absolute split along gender lines. In each there have been 
men using the care orientation and women using the justice 
orientation, but there has been a statistically significant 
relationship between gender and moral orientation. 
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Problem Development 
Gilligan’s hypothesis of two distinct moral 
orientations suggests some interesting possibilities for 
research within organizations. Which moral orientation is 
most evident in work-related conflicts? Do men and women 
reason differently about moral issues in the workplace? The 
interview and coding scheme developed by Lyons (1982) offer 
the potential of interpreting and categorizing diverse views 
of morality and individualistic constructions of reality. 
This type of interview allows us to explore how men and 
women define morality in the workplace. Before the level of 
moral responsibility within corporations can be measured, 
there needs to be some comprehension of the many different 
definitions of moral responsibility which are in operation 
in any given company. 
The focus of the research presented here is on the 
reasoning individuals have used in making choices in work 
situations which they define as morally conflictual. The 
interviews described in the next chapter address several 
research questions. What are the moral conflicts that arise 
for a group of first-level industrial managers? What are 
the considerations they use in attempting to resolve the 
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conflicts? Do people experience clearly different types of 
moral conflicts within the same organization and managerial 
level? 
Hypotheses. The research applies Gilligan's theory in 
a corporate setting by testing the following hypotheses: 
HI: There are two distinct modes of moral reasoning 
used in work-related conflcits; these are consistent with 
Gilligan’s descriptions of morality as justice and morality 
as care. 
H2: Morality as care is more frequently voiced by 
females and morality as justice is more frequently voiced by 
males in describing work-related moral conflicts. 
The hypotheses were tested by extensive interview data, 
gathered at the site of a major industrial corporation. In 
addition to the hypotheses, tangential research questions 
were explored with the analysis of demographic data. Data 
on age, length of time with the company, managerial status, 
religion, and Myers-Briggs personality type were compiled 
for each subject. These were tested for significant 
relationships with the types of moral reasoning used by the 
subjects. The process of gathering and testing the data is 
described in the following chapter. 
The field of moral development has been challenged by 
the hypothesis that there are two distinct definitions of 
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morality which shape moral reasoning. Several researchers 
have described these as gender-related (Gilligan, 1977; 
Lyons, 1983; Langdale, 1983). The research presented here 
examines this conceptualization of morality in a setting 
which has been traditionally male-dominated. Women’s roles 
in industry still beg definition. The strength or absence 
of Gilligan’s female voice of morality within this context 
may be a measure of the organizational culture, or perhaps 
of the adaptability of the chosen mode of moral reasoning. 
The research strives for insights into what a sample of 
first-level managers in a major corporation perceive to be 
moral behavior. The interview data may reflect the 
selective memories and the self-justifications of behavior 
of managers in difficult situations. Rather than using an 
arbitrary definition of morality to measure if managers are 
ethical, this research compares and categorizes the 
different ways that people apply their sense of morality on 
the job. 
The field of business ethics is severely lacking in 
empirical data which describe the decision making process of 
managers facing ethical dilemmas. The contribution of this 
study may not fill that gap but it makes the hole slightly 
less gaping and raises questions as an invitation for 
further research. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Gathering 
The research hypotheses were tested by gathering 
interview data from the forty participants and analyzing the 
data for categories defined by Gilligan (1982) and Lyons 
(1983). 
The site selected is a major manufacturing facility of 
a Fortune 100 high tech industrial corporation. It will be 
referred to as the Steng Corporation, which is a pseudonym. 
With the approval of a senior vice president and the legal 
and personnel departments, the interviews were scheduled by 
the writer and the participants and were conducted on site 
during working hours. A research agreement secured 
anonymity for both the corporation and the individual 
participants. A copy of the research agreement is included 
in Appendix A. 
Description of the Sample. The sample from which the 
data are derived is described in Table 1. Equal numbers of 
men and women were interviewed, ranging in age from 
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thirty-two to sixty-two. The grade range selected is 
described as first-level managers which includes positions 
of varying responsibility, such as production foreman, 
senior technician, purchasing consultant, project engineer, 
and manufacturing materials manager. There are 
approximately equal numbers of participants with managerial 
experience and those who are non-management professionals. 
These staff professionals are within the same grade level as 
the managers, but they have chosen to work more 
independently, making their own contribution without 
managerial responsibilities. Some of them will move into 
managerial positions when the opportunity arises. 
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TABLE 1 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Me n 
Age: 
(N=20) 
30-39 
6 
40-49 
7 
50-59 
5 
60-69 
2 
Wome n (N=20) 13 5 2 0 
Men (N=20) 
Present or 
Managers 
11 
Past Non-Management 
Professionals 
9 
Wome n (N=20) 9 11 
Years at Company : 1-9 10-19 20-29 
Men (N=20) 1 14 5 
Women (N=20) 7 13 0 
Religion: Catholic Protestant Jewish None 
Men (N=20) 10 8 0 2 
Wome n (N=20) 2 10 1 7 
In order to obtain equal numbers of male and female 
participants, the first level of managers and staff 
professionals was selected as the population. This is grade 
levels 10-12 of the Johnson County employees of the Steng 
Corporation. Johnson County, like Steng Corporation, is a 
pseudonym. Two random sample programs were run, one on the 
males and one on the females of this population. Each 
potential participant was contacted by letter and by phone 
to determine whether he or she was interested and willing to 
participate in the research project. Those who were not 
interested in participating were replaced by further random 
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selections from the population in order to maintain the 
desired level of forty participants. 
Seven men and nine women declined to take part in the 
study. They gave a variety of reasons: too busy, not 
interested, didn’t feel they had anything to talk about, or 
didn’t want to talk about Steng. Some potential 
participants suggested calling back later in the 
interviewing process when they might have more time. In a 
few cases interviews were eventually conducted with these 
people, in others they were replaced by participants who 
were more available. 
In Table 1 demographic differences are evident between 
the men and the women interviewed. As would be expected 
from the recent increase of women in professional roles, the 
ages of the men are more evenly distributed, while the women 
in this position are grouped in the younger age brackets. 
Consistent with this difference in age range is the 
variation in length of time with the company. One third of 
the women have been at Steng less than ten years and no 
women participants have been employed at Steng for twenty 
years. However, one forth of the men have been at Steng for 
twenty years or more, and only one has been employed there 
less than ten years. There are also differences in the 
stated religious affiliation of the men and women. One half 
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of the men said they were Catholics, while only one tenth of 
the women described themselves as Catholics. Only one tenth 
of the men said they had no religious affiliation, while one 
third of the women said they had none. These demographic 
variables, sex, age, managerial staus, time with the 
company, and religion, were all tested for covariance. The 
results of these statistical tests are in the appendix. 
The Interviews. All participants were personally 
interviewed in private offices or conference rooms at the 
Steng site by the author. The interviews were tape recorded 
and transcribed. The transcriptions were then used as the 
basis for the coding analysis. Each interview lasted 
approximately sixty to ninety minutes. 
The interview schedule is shown below and also in 
Appendix B. These questions are adapted from Perry (1968) 
and Lyons (1983). Similar questions have been used in other 
research in conjunction with the coding scheme analysis 
(Langdale, 1983). Changes that are unique to this study are 
the aspects of relating the questions about moral conflict 
and moral definitions to work situations, and to 
organizational roles and responsibilities. A few questions 
were added as a result of responses obtained in a pilot 
study. (A brief description of the pilot study is in 
Appendix C). Several pieces of factual information were 
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solicited and noted either before or during the interview. 
These included the age of the participant and the length of 
time employed by the corporation. The sex of the 
participant was also noted. At the end of each interview 
the participant was asked if he/she had any religious 
affiliation. This was noted in terms of denomination, and 
as current or past affiliation. 
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THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
I. Introduction 
Looking back over the past year at work, what stays with 
y ou ? 
II. Self-Concept 
Having talked briefly about your work life in the past year, 
now I would like to ask you how you think about yourself. 
1. How would you describe yourself to yourself? 
2. Is the way you see yourself now different from the 
way you saw yourself in the past? How? What led to the 
change ? 
III. Moral Conflict and Choice 
All people have had the experience of being in situations 
where they had to make a decision but weren’t sure what was 
the right thing to do. 
1. Have you ever faced a moral dilemma in your work 
life? or Have you ever been in a situation at work where you 
faced a moral conflict and had to make a decision but you 
weren't sure what was the right thing to do? 
Construction of the Problem 
1. What was the situation? 
2. What was the conflict for you in that situation? 
Resolution of the Problem 
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1. In thinking about what to do, what did you 
consider? Why? Anything else? Any other things you 
considered in trying to decide what to do? 
The Decision/Choice 
1. What did you decide to do? 
2. What happened? 
Evaluation of the Resolution 
1. Do you think that was the right thing to do? 
Why/Why not? 
2. (If it was a while ago) When you think back about 
the decision now, do you think about it in a different way? 
How? What led to the change? 
3. Did you consider this situation you’ve described as 
a moral problem? 
Concept of Morality 
1. What does morality mean to you? 
2. Does professional morality differ from personal 
morality for you? 
3. What makes something a moral problem for you? 
4. What does responsibility mean to you? 
5. When responsibility to oneself and to others 
conflict, how should one choose? 
6. Have you ever felt especially responsible for 
upholding the organization's rules or standards? 
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7. Are there times when you feel that your moral 
standards are different from the corporation’s standards or 
expectations of behavior? 
8. When responsibilty to oneself and to the 
organization conflict, how should one choose? 
IV. Relationships 
1. Can you tell me about a relationship that has been 
important in your professional life? 
2. What about the relationship makes it important? 
3. Has that relationship changed over time? In what 
ways? What led to the change? 
4. Do you (or did you) and (this person) ever 
disagree? Do you voice your disagreement? Why? Why not? 
5. Do you and (this person) depend on each other? 
What does dependence mean to you? 
What does independence mean to you? 
V. Success 
At the beginning of this interview I asked you about how you 
see yourself now, in the present. Now I want to ask: 
1. What will you need to have done in order to see 
yourself and your life as successful? 
2. Does being successful in your life mean something 
different to you now, at this stage in your career, than it 
used to? What do you think led to those changes? 
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The major part of the interview focused on the moral 
conflict discussion in section III of the questions. This 
section of the interview was coded with Lyons' coding scheme 
(to be described in a moment). Also in section III, under 
the subsection Concept of Morality, the responses to the 
first two questions are included in the analysis presented 
in this paper. These two questions were interpreted 
separately from the Lyons coding scheme used throughout the 
moral conflict section. The data from the two moral 
definition questions was analyzed in a comparative, 
qualitative way. Bearing in mind the two hypothesized 
definitions of morality, that of justice and of care, the 
responses to "What does morality mean to you?" were read 
over several times looking for patterns and anomalies. Many 
responses were similar and rote-like. The most interesting 
data were the choices of examples to elaborate the routine 
answers. The patterns and anomalies as well as the range of 
examples are discussed in Chapter IV. The responses to the 
question "Does professional morality differ from personal 
morality for you?" are analyzed and presented in a similar 
manner. The responses to interview questions I, II, IV, and 
V were not used in this study. 
Further qualitative analysis was conducted in examining 
the types of conflicts which were presented in the 
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interviews. Of particular interest was with whom the 
conflicts occurred: were there patterns of conflicts with 
subordinates, peers, or superiors? If so what do these 
patterns represent? Also what was the range of types of 
conflicts? These questions were exploratory, their 
relevance becoming evident in the midst of the data 
gathering process. The data related to the hypotheses was 
gathered and analyzed as intended. But in the process, 
further questions were raised. A few of these are addressed 
here. Many more interesting questions will arise in the 
continuing analysis of the data offering broader 
implications and interpretations. For this study the most 
relevant analysis beyond the immediate hypotheses testing is 
an understanding of what kinds of moral conflicts managers 
face at work. 
Data Analysis 
The interviews were open-ended, semi-structured 
interviews in which an individual presented an actual moral 
conflict faced at work and described the situation, the 
conflict, how she/he evaluated what should be done, and how 
it was resolved. 
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Coding of the interview data followed Lyons’ 
methodology. An overview of the coding scheme is presented 
here for a general understanding of the process. 
The coding process is a form of content analysis. 
’’Considerations" articulated by the individual are the unit 
of analysis for coding. A "consideration" is an idea 
presented by the individual as an element considered in 
making choices in each of three component stages. These are 
coded separately for the three dilemma components: 1) the 
construction of the dilemma, or what the person specifies as 
the conflict for him/her within the situation; 2) how the 
conflict was resolved; and 3) how the individual evaluates 
the resolution. These three components are identified 
respectively as the problem, the resolution, and the 
evaluation. 
Each consideration that the individual uses in the 
various aspects of the moral dilemma presentation is 
categorized either as a Consideration of Response (Care), or 
as a Consideration of Rights (Justice), if it fits on the 
basis of these categories as elaborated below. If it fits 
neither of these categories, it is coded in a category 
labeled "Uncodable". If, in any interview research of this 
kind, a significant number of the considerations fall in the 
uncodable category, it may be evidence that the categories 
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of Response and Rights do not adequately represent or 
describe the types of moral reasoning voiced by that 
sample. 
The categorization of considerations as either Response 
or Rights follows these specifics (Lyons, 1983): 
Considerations of Response (Care) are those in which an 
individual refers to: 
1. General effects on others (unelaborated): 
2. Maintenance or restoration of relationships; or response 
to another in recognition of the interdependence of 
people on one another; 
3. The welfare/well-being of another or the avoidance of 
conflict; or, the alleviation of another's burden/hurt 
or suffering (physical or pyschological); 
4. The primacy of the "situation over the principle"; 
5. Care of the self; care of self balanced with care of 
others. 
Considerations of Rights (Justice) are those in which 
an individual refers to: 
1. General effects to self (unelaborated - but including 
"trouble;" how to decide); 
2. Obligations, duty, or commitments; 
Standards, rules, or principles for self or society; or 
considerations of fairness, that is, how one would like 
3. 
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to be treated if in the other’s place; 
4. The primacy of the "principle over the situation"; 
5. The fact that others have their own contexts. (Each 
person must reason from the basis of his or her own 
experience and perspective on the world.) 
In sum, the coder reads through the interview data and 
classifies the moral conflict presentation into sections 
corresponding to the problem, the resolution, and the 
evaluation. Each of these components is then combed for 
considerations. Each consideration is coded into its proper 
category. All of the Rights considerations are totaled as 
are all of the Response considerations and the difference 
figured for an determination of the predominant mode used 
(Lyons, 1982). In order to assign a number to the strength 
of the dominant mode, the percentages of each moral 
reasoning mode used are calculated within the total 
considerations. For example, a manager mentions fifteen 
different considerations in the process of talking about the 
conflict, the resolution, and the evaluation. Eleven of 
them were rights considerations and four were response 
considerations. The manager is described as predominating 
in Rights reasoning in this situation with a measure of 
73%. 
For the interviews as a whole there is a resulting 
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tally of predominant modes used in work-related conflicts. 
There is also a clear record of the strength of the 
predominant modes. These results were tested for 
differences related to gender, age, religious affiliation, 
length of time with the company, and whether the individual 
was a manager or a non-management professional. 
Internal Validity. The internal validity of this 
research is enhanced by the randomization of the sample from 
the population. However it is threatened by the 
self-selection of the participants after randomization. 
Some members of the selected sample chose not to participate 
when they learned the topic of the research. Given the type 
of information being sought from the participants, it was 
necessary to have voluntary participation based on full 
knowledge of the research questions. Forcing people or 
enticing people to participate would not provide valid data 
on personal issues and conflicts. 
It may be thought that the internal validity of the 
interview data is limited by lack of truth-telling or by 
one-sided perceptions of the situations being described. 
People may not convey the story "accurately" or their 
experience may have lacked some useful and critical 
information about the case. However, in this research what 
is most important is how the participants experienced the 
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situation, what they chose to remember or to tell. It is 
this information that was evaluated, not a scientific 
description of the dilemma. 
Face Validity. The coding process demands several oral 
reiterations of the various components of the interview to 
gain the sense and context of what the person is saying. 
The coders, first individually and then together, read the 
interview questions and responses aloud several times in 
order to check the face validity of their interpretations. 
External Validity. The limited extent to which the 
findings may be generalized is confined to the specific 
population of grades 10-12 of Johnson County employees of 
the Steng corporation. No claims are made that the data 
gathered represents the entire range of managers within the 
corporation or the moral reasoning of men and women in other 
organizations. 
Reliability. The internal consistency of the 
interpretive methodology is supported by the process of 
establishing intercoder reliability. All of the conflict 
interviews were coded by the author, and twenty percent of 
those were independently coded by two other researchers. 
These six coded conflicts consisted of three men and three 
women. Agreement on interpretation of considerations was 
measured by comparing the ratio of justice considerations to 
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care considerations found by each coder. Agreement on these 
ratios was 95%. Agreement on the predominant mode used by 
each participant was unanimous among the coders. 
The reliability of the research may be threatened by 
researcher bias in the interview process, i.e. knowing the 
hypotheses, has the interviewer led the interviewees into 
certain statements or influenced their statements by verbal 
or nonverbal responses? Recognizing this as a potential 
problem, preliminary interviews were conducted at another 
company in order to practice non-intrusive interviewing 
techniques, and to pre-test the interview questions. This 
pilot study in described briefly in the appendix. 
In this type of research it is important for the 
interviewer to have a guiding hypothesis in order to pursue 
certain words and ideas raised by the interviewee, such as 
"could you explain what you mean when you say 'trust’?" or 
"why was that important to you?" The active listening aspect 
of the interview must be guided by the underlying 
hypotheses. The interview questions pursue the views of the 
participant, but particular views are wanted in as much 
depth as the participant can articulate. The depth of 
considerations and explanations of reasoning is necessary to 
gain enough information to test for fit with the 
hypothesized modes of moral reasoning. Guarding against 
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intrusive comments and posing the interview questions 
consistently was the most reliable method of conducting the 
interviews. 
There may be concerns that the interviewees’ awareness 
of the tape recording biased the responses given. This did 
seem to influence what people chose to talk about, in that 
once the tape was turned off, people opened up and shared 
different, more personal conflicts or questions about 
morality than they had before. The use of a tape recorder 
is clearly an intervention, influencing participants’ 
responses to difficult and personal questions. However, it 
was felt that the advantage of using a transcript of the 
interview in the coding analysis outweighed the disadvantage 
of the intervention. The interviews were preceded by a 
discussion of the research agreement and a promise of 
confidentiality for participants and for the corporation. 
With this assurance, participants were relaxed and trusting 
enough to share specifics about events and people they 
worked with during the taped interviews. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter uses a vocabulary which has emerged among 
researchers in the course of studying Gilligan’s thesis 
(1982). The terms "justice", "rights," and "rules" are used 
to describe the orientation of reasoning about morality as 
justice. In contrast, the terms "care" and "response" are 
used to describe the orientation of morality as care. As 
discussed earlier, the justice orientation underlies the 
traditional approach to analyzing moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 
1971), while the care orientation is the "different voice" 
presented by Gilligan (1977). 
The findings presented here are twofold. The first are 
the quantitative, measurable results which bear directly on 
the hypotheses. These are the coded results of the conflict 
portions of the interviews, and their relationship with the 
demographic variables. The moral reasoning orientation of 
the participants is reported and examined for correlations 
with the descriptive variables. The quantitative data are 
presented in terms of the specific results followed by 
analyses and interpretation of the data. 
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The second group of findings is qualitative. It is the 
data which answers questions about the kinds of moral 
conflicts experienced at work. With whom did most of the 
conflicts occur? How did the participants define morality 
for themselves? Did they perceive a difference between 
their professional morality and personal morality? The 
observed and collected responses to these questions provide 
insights which contribute to a better understanding and 
interpretation of all the gathered data. 
It should be understood that the interpretations and 
explanations elaborated in this chapter are the most 
plausible based on prior research and theories of moral 
decision making. These interpretations should be subjected 
to appropriate field research. 
No Perceived Moral Conflicts at Work 
Results. The first finding became evident in the 
process of conducting the interviews. When asked to 
describe a moral conflict in their work life, an unexpected 
number of the participants said they had "never faced" a 
moral conflict at work. This response revealed an 
unarticulated assumption of this research. That assumption 
59 
was: people experience moral conflicts at work. In fact 
this was true for only two-thirds of the participants. This 
percentage may be higher than it would be for the population 
from which the sample is derived. Several people initially 
selected in the random sample declined to be interviewed on 
the basis that they had nothing to talk about. Of the forty 
participants interviewed 67.5% had a work-related moral 
conflict, while 32.5% said they had experienced no 
work-related moral conflict. The demographic 
characteristics of the "no conflict" group of interviewees 
compared with the "conflict" group are presented in Tables 
2-6. As is evident in these tables, there are no 
characteristics distinguishing between the two groups of 
participants . 
TABLE 2 
AGE OF PARTICIPANTS 
Mean S.D 
Conflict 42.5 7.8 
(N=27) 
No Conflict 43.8 9.7 
(N=13) 
t(19)= -.433, p= .67 
i 
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TABLE 3 
NUMBER OF YEARS EMPLOYED AT STENG 
Conflict 
(N=27) 
No Conflict 
(N=13) 
Mean 
13.8 
14.5 
S.D. 
4.6 
6.0 
t(19)= -.305 , p= .76 
TABLE 4 
FREQUENCY OF FEMALES AND MALES 
Females 
Conflict 
13 
No Conflict 
7 
Totals 
20 
Males 14 6 20 
Totals 27 13 40 
Df= 1 Chi- square= .11: Not Significant 
TABLE 5 
FREQUENCY OF MANAGERS AND 
f 
NON-MANAGERS 
Managers 
Conflict 
16 
No Conflict 
4 
Totals 
20 
Non-Managers 11 9 20 
Totals 27 13 40 
Df= 1 Chi-square= 2.85: Not Significant 
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TABLE 6 
FREQUENCY OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
Conflict No Conflict Totals 
Catholic 8 4 12 
Protestant 14 4 18 
No Religion 4 5 9 
Totals 26 13 39 
Df= 2 Chi-square= 3.00: Not Significant 
Note: Two cells have expected frequencies less than 5 - see 
footnote in Appendix D. 
Analysis. Why did 33% of the managers and 
non-management professionals interviewed "never face" a 
moral conflict at work? Looking at these data from another 
perspective we see that 67% of the managers and 
professionals interviewed did face moral conflicts at work. 
That is a significant number, especially in light of those 
who claim that making moral decisions is not part of the 
manager’s job. This result, in and of itself, would be 
worthy of study in other organizations and work 
environments. 
But many of those who did not feel they had faced a 
moral conflict at work did describe, sometimes almost 
incidentally, personal moral conflicts experienced outside 
of work. These included such dilemmas as how to care for a 
handicapped son, whether continuing to work would allow for 
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adequate attention for a new baby, how to spend enough time 
with a close family member dying of cancer, a love affair 
and the struggle to maintain the marital relationship, and 
whether to accept a new job which would mean moving away 
from family. Most of these descriptions were prefaced by "I 
can’t think of any conflicts at work, but the biggest moral 
conflict in my life has been...." These personal conflicts 
were not solicited in the interviews and many of them were 
not discussed in depth. 
The message about work seemed to be: "I do my job well, 
sometimes I disagree with people, sometimes I have to make 
tough decisions, but I follow the rules, and I respect the 
corporation. Moral conflicts just don’t come up for me." 
These people do face moral conflicts in their lives, but say 
they do not at work. Morality to them may mean something 
different, defined in personal terms, carried out in private 
rather than in professional life. If a manager’s moral 
reasoning orientation was care-focused, but that manager had 
learned not to act on those concerns at work, then moral 
conflicts might only be seen in personal life, and not in 
the professional setting. Decisions at work are made on the 
basis of efficiency and effectiveness. For some people and 
some positions this clearly works and is the best way for 
them to operate. This approach may require an ability to 
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wear different moral hats at home and at work. 
Overall impressions from the interviews offer several 
additional explanations of the "no conflict" group. No one 
explanation fits the entire group. 
1. Rules have been thought out in advance so as to 
guard against moral dilemmas, e.g., I never accept gifts 
from vendors, I would never turn in a fellow buyer for 
taking gifts, I would never lie to make schedule, I always 
insist that my staff account for expenses precisely. 
2. A few people suggested that because they did not 
have strong black and white rules about morality they did 
not "go around imposing my standards on others" and 
therefore did not come into conflict with others’ 
decisions . 
3. As non-managers, some participants felt that the 
lack of managerial responsibility protected them from moral 
conflicts because "those are almost always related to 
dealing with other people." 
4. The last question asked about behavior and choice 
in a moral conflict situation was "When you think back on 
the situation now, do you think about it differently?" Some 
people said, in effect, "No, I’m sure I did the right 
thing." Others said, 
I would have handled it differently. I wouldn’t 
have gone to my boss because nothing happened. They 
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don’t like you to make trouble, they don’t want to know 
about conflicts. The person I reported it to said to 
me, ’this conversation never happened,’ 
An important question is raised by these statements. 
Are people encouraged not to have moral conflicts at work by 
the response (or lack of response) they receive in trying to 
resolve them? 
Dominant Use of the Justice Orientation 
Results. The second major finding was the moral 
orientations of the participants who did face moral 
conflicts at work. All but one described these conflicts 
and their resolution of the conflicts in the terms of rules 
and justice. The data did not fall into two groups, one 
using predominantly care reasoning and the other using 
predominantly justice reasoning. Thus the demographic data 
could not be tested for correlations with these expected but 
not discovered groups. In order to present the data in a 
meaningful way, the percentage of justice considerations 
within the total number of considerations was estimated for 
each participant. Thus the numbers presented below indicate 
the strength of the justice reasoning used by the subjects 
who reported a conflict. The one participant with less than 
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50% is the individual whose discussion focused on care 
issues and reasoning. His score was 66.7% care or 33.3% 
justice. Thus the justice focused participants were 13 men 
and 13 women. 
TABLE 7 
PERCENTAGE OF JUSTICE CONSIDERATIONS USED 
<50% 50-59% 60-69% 70-79% 80-89% 90-99% 100% 
Men (N=14) 1032116 
Women (N=13) 01 3321 
Although the sample size dwindled due to the 
conflict/no conflict grouping, there are some differences 
that are apparent in looking at the data in this way. In 
this sample, more men used exclusively justice reasoning 
(the 100% category), and correspondingly, more women voiced 
some care issues within their predominantly justice 
discussion of their conflicts. However, there were no 
statistically significant relationships between the strength 
of the justice reasoning and the demographic variables: sex, 
age, length of time at Steng, managerial position, or 
religion. The Pearson correlation of the age of 
participants with their justice reasoning scores is r= .104, 
and is not significant. The Pearson Correlation of the 
number of years at Steng and the justice reasoning scores is 
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r= .034, and is not significant. In Tables 8-10 the 
justice reasoning scores are calulated and represented by 
the percentage of justice considerations of the total number 
of considerations articulated by each individual. 
TABLE 8 
MALES AND FEMALES WITH JUSTICE REASONING SCORE 
Males 
(N=14) 
Females 
(N=13) 
Mean 
81.8 
77.5 
S.D. 
20.8 
14.4 
t(24)= .62, p= .55 
TABLE 9 
MANAGERS AND NON-MANAGERS WITH JUSTICE REASONING SCORE 
Managers 
(N=16) 
Non-Managers 
(N = ll) 
Mean 
77.9 
82.4 
S.D. 
19.6 
15.3 
t(24)= -.66, p= .52 
TABLE 10 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: JUSTICE REASONING SCORE WITH RELIGION 
Source of 
Variation: 
SS DF MS F P 
Religion 911.5 2 455.8 
Residual 7092.5 23 308.4 
Total 8004.0 25 1.48 NS 
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There were no significant correlations between the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and either the occurrence of 
moral conflict, or the strength of the rights orientation 
used by participants. The distribution of the Myers-Briggs 
scores and the correlational tests with justice reasoning 
are reported in Appendix E. 
Analysis. Why is there an overwhelming use of the 
moral orientation of rights, rules, and justice among the 
managers and non-management professionals interviewed? 
Fundamentally, a corporation is a group of people joined 
together for the purpose of accomplishing some defined, 
common goals. Each person has an assigned role to play in 
the accomplishment of those goals. Everyone expects others 
to fulfill their roles as organizational members. Steng has 
a "team" culture. Although there have been significant 
lay-offs within the past decade, the people who have lived 
through the belt-tightening times are loyal to the 
organization and its ideals. They sometimes have conflicts 
with their immediate supervisors and their directives, but 
almost to a person, they express great faith in the driving 
purpose, goals, and intentions of top management. There is 
a sense of belonging among Steng employees. It is for this 
sense as well as for their own job security that they want 
Steng to survive, to do well in the face of growing national 
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and international competition. Some of the conflict 
discussions gave evidence of a feeling of personal 
responsibility for Steng’s image in the community at large. 
This type of strong culture builds, often intentionally, a 
deeply held commitment to the organization, a clear sense of 
one's role, duties, and obligations (Katz and Kahn, 1978; 
McCoy, 1985). Certainty about roles and obligations seemed 
to underlie many of the considerations people voiced in 
resolving their moral dilemmas. The following excerpts from 
three different participants demonstrate this point. 
A young woman, struggling with a proposed "deal" which 
would benefit her superior but would detract from 
organizational productivity, described her situation: 
I felt that I would be, it's almost like I would 
be drawing money out of the company and not giving the 
company anything back, except protecting this 
particular individual. So, I felt that my personal 
sense of values was being violated, and my notion of 
how to conduct business efficiently and effectively was 
being violated . 
An experienced manager described a repeated conflict: 
There are a number of times when you know as 
manager that a particular individual has been 
identified to be laid off....and everyday, and it may 
go on for several weeks, you have to come to work and 
acknowledge the person, deal with them, work with them, 
knowing that at a given point in time they are going to 
be out of a job literally. And yet, you can't prepare 
them, because your job as a manager is to try to get 
the pieces done, work with the company, and maintain 
the morale. It's a moral difficulty because I always 
feel that if I know that a particular individual is 
going to have something like that happen, that I should 
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tell him.... however I also understand.. .that in the 
business we do need his services for three more 
months . 
A non-management professional felt a strong obligation 
not to install a faulty computer system despite pressure to 
conceal the problems and begin operations: 
My conflict was, I knew there was going to be 
trouble and they weren't going to like it, but it was 
what I felt was right as far as the company 
benefit. . . .11 was important because the product that we 
were going to put in would have failed and caused a lot 
of problems, and the union people may not have gotten 
their paychecks because of it and I won’t do that. 1 
take good care of my systems. I'm not going to do 
anything that's going to adversely affect the people 
that I am being paid to support, which is the people 
out on the floor. 
Reasoning about moral conflicts from this perspective 
of one's role and obligations within the corporation falls 
in Lyons' category of rules, rights, and justice. Although 
there is a clear concern for avoiding adverse effects on 
others, the primary basis of the reasoning is from the 
obligations attached to this participant's role in the 
company. The care concerns are present but subsumed within 
the obligations. One is following a clearly defined set of 
rules. They may not be written, and they are often broader 
than one's job description, but they are the implicit 
commitment to the achievement of the group's purpose. This 
commitment is a fact of life among most of Steng's 
managers. It is not surprising then that it is a dominant 
C 
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factor in the reasoning of these managers and staff 
professionals. At work, they are committed to their 
organization. If a conflict arises, they consider the 
impact on the organization, themselves, and other people who 
might be involved, in approximately that order. This is not 
to say that they take care of the organization before they 
take care of themselves, but their initial reasoning 
process, about moral issues as about any other problems, is 
"What should I do as a Steng 
Manager/Buyer/Engineer/Foreman". One engineer put it this 
way : 
A situation comes up, if there are moral aspects 
to it, I think the first approach is to handle it like 
you are handling other situations so it’s not really a 
conflict or problem. It’s part of the decision or 
behavior requirement. 
In short, the individual manager’s (and other 
professional’s) commitment to that person’s role within the 
corporation shapes his or her reasoning about work-related 
conflicts, including moral conflicts. 
Another aspect of the individual’s role in the 
organization is that these people get rewarded for following 
the rules, for making fair and just decisions. They do not 
get rewarded for being caring, building strong relationships 
at work, or for alleviating others’ burdens. Steng is not a 
social service organization. It is not in operation to make 
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its workers or customers feel cared for. Steng is a profit 
dependent corporation, striving to manufacture reliable, 
competitive products. It rewards its employees for goal 
achievement. According to a behaviorist argument, the 
corporation builds in rule-following by its reward 
structure. 
This would suggest a phenomenon that is entirely 
consistent with popular literature about survival in the 
corporate arena as a matter of learning and playing by the 
"rules of the game". Those who can play by the corporate 
rules stay in "the game", those who can’t, or don’t want to, 
leave (Maccoby, 1976). By the time people have made it to a 
managerial level at Steng, they have for the most part 
agreed to the rules of the game, or they have opted out. 
Thus there is a self-selection factor in this sample. It is 
not representative of the general population. It is a group 
of men and women who have proven themselves good corporate 
players. Therefore, these organizational rules become the 
moral referent for Steng’s managers and employees, 
explaining their reliance on a rights, rules, and justice 
approach to moral conflicts at work. 
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Gender Differences and the Lack Thereof 
Analysis. Why is there no significant gender 
difference in the moral reasoning used in these work 
conflicts, contrary to what one would expect from Gilligan's 
theory and other recent research? The findings described 
here suggest that whatever gender differences have been 
found in other research may be context specific. If there 
is a general difference between men and women, it does not 
carry over into strong organizational cultures where both 
women and men are trained to think and judge as corporate 
members. In such settings, either the "carers" have been 
selected out or they have learned to use the reasoning 
dominant to the organization. The voice of care, responding 
to others in their terms, maintaining relationships for the 
sake of interdependence, and alleviating the burdens or 
suffering of another, do not have a big role in corporate 
culture. 
Looking back to the data, it is clear that most people 
voiced some care issues along with their justice 
considerations. This confirms the earlier findings that 
many people have the ability to reason either in the justice 
mode or the care mode (Lyons, 1982; Johnston, 1985). If men 
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and women do have the ability to use both moral orientations 
and the ability to choose which one is the most appropriate 
in different settings (though not necessarily in the 
vocabulary of moral development theory or philosophy), then 
the smart business players should figure out early on which 
mode is most credible within their work environment. People 
who use a moral reasoning of care or response in their 
personal life may simply know not to use it at work. 
Individuals who do not have the ability or willingness to 
use justice reasoning do not stay very long or do not 
advance in a dominantly rights and rules environment. 
These explanations apply equally well to men as to 
women. But it is the women whom one would have expected to 
use the care reasoning, given the earlier findings. 
However, in the last decade women have been coached from all 
sides to succeed in business, to make it big, to compete, to 
increase the ranks of corporate women, in short to learn the 
rules by which men have succeeded, and to play the game 
aggressively (Hennig and Jardim, 1977). It should be no 
surprise that first-level managers, women in their thirties 
and forties, are using the same vocabulary, the same thought 
processes as their male counterparts. They have learned 
what is required. 
Those women and men who have the ability and interest 
74 
to reason as corporate members are building on and 
strengthening that ability. It is important to interpret 
the findings of this study in the context of the complex 
demands of corporate life, as well as the context of 
society’s current interpretation of success and its 
requirements. 
An additional interpretation of the strong justice 
orientation voiced in these interviews was suggested by the 
verifying coders. Several of the participants seemed to be 
describing issues that were fundamentally care concerns but 
justifying them in justice terms. Perhaps in the Steng 
environment they had to justify their conflicts in those 
terms. Some examples demonstrate this point. 
Actually the conflict for me was how I knew that 
the right thing to do was to let him go [to another job 
within Steng] and from his standpoint, but for me I 
might wind up losing a valuable employee in the 
department and he has been a good employee.... If I let 
the guy go, and he accepts before the promotion here 
comes through, then I would have looked bad in terms of 
my management to say hey, you’ve got this guy that’s a 
valuable man and you let the guy skip and he’s going to 
another department. So why did you let him do it?....I 
just really weighed the fact that how would I feel if I 
was in his shoes? How would I feel if I was cut off 
from pursuing an opportunity in another area that I was 
interested in? 
In this excerpt the manager’s concern is about how to 
do what is right for an employee from the employee’s 
perspective. This is a care consideration. But other 
considerations come into play to weigh the balance towards a 
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justice focus: What would my managers say? (a duty or role 
consideration), How would I feel if I were in his shoes? 
(fairness, justice as the golden rule), 1 might lose a 
valuable resource in the department (effects to self). This 
case could be seen as one in which the manager is 
predominantly rights or justice oriented with some care 
considerations taken into account. This is strictly 
consistent with the coding results. 
Alternatively the theory above suggests the major issue 
of concern is a care issue but the setting for the conflict 
requires that it be reasoned out in justice terms. The 
person may tend more toward a care orientation in defining 
moral dilemmas, but the work environment imposes certain 
modes of reasoning and decision making. This perspective is 
supported by England who argues that individual managers 
come to work with certain "intended values," but the 
expression of these values is blocked by organizational 
factors (England, 1975). In this case the manager may have 
attached a strong personal value to providing support and 
encouragement to his employee, but the Steng environment did 
not permit the expression of that value except as it fit the 
dominant logic of fairness. 
Another example of interwoven care and justice 
considerations follows: 
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Well, the part of it that was the conflict was 
knowing the person personally. Knowing that they were 
on this list to be laid off and either wanting to tell 
them that maybe you ought to go here and look or maybe 
you need to do something else. Somehow in my mind you 
want to be able to prepare people for the worst if you 
can. But yet you're privy to information that you 
really just can't divulge to them....Some of those 
things [I considered] were: Can I help save that 
person? Is there anything that I can do to help save 
that person's job? If there is, I want to do it....Now 
in some cases you really could figure out and you could 
say well, I think they're probably right in passing 
judgement and based on this the person should be let 
go, because they're not being productive and if they're 
not performing well then they should not be here....I 
only had the conflict if I thought it was an unfair 
situation. If I thought the decision was a good one, 
was a fair decision, I didn't have a conflict with 
it....In some instances, they were not chosen by the 
same criteria. Sometimes you just knew that, so that's 
what I was considering unfair. 
At first glance this example gives the impression of an 
extremely care oriented person. There are many care 
considerations voiced, but the coding process also revealed 
a strong concern for fairness in performance evaluations. 
Here the same excerpt is separated into considerations with 
the coding of the considerations shown in parentheses. 
Well, the part of it that was the conflict was 
knowing the person personally. Knowing that they were 
on this list to be laid off and either wanting to tell 
them that maybe you ought to go here and look or maybe 
you need to do something else. Somehow in my mind you 
want to be able to prepare people for the worst if you 
can. (Care: Welfare of another, alleviation of 
another's suffering) 
But yet you're privy to information that you 
really just can't divulge to them...(Just ice: 
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Obligations, duties, commitments) 
Some of those things [I considered] were: Can I 
help save that person? Is there anything that I can do 
to help save that person's job? If there is, I want to 
do it...(Care: Welfare of another) 
Now in some cases you really could figure out and 
you could say well, 1 think they're probably right in 
passing judgement and based on this the person should 
be let go, because they're not being productive and if 
they're not performing well then they should not be 
here. (Justice: Standards, rules, or principles for 
self or society; considers fairness) 
I only had the conflict if I thought it was an 
unfair situation. If I thought the decision was a good 
one, was a fair decision, I didn't have a conflict with 
it....In some instances, they were not chosen by the 
same criteria. Sometimes you just knew that, so that's 
what I was considering unfair. (Justice: Standards, 
rules, principles, fairness) 
This excerpt shows only a few of the justice and care 
considerations articulated by the participant. In coding 
the entire interview the fairness becomes an overriding 
factor in determining the limits of "caring." It is quite 
clear from the excerpt that there are motivations to help 
others, to alleviate their burdens, "to save people," and to 
express concern for their welfare, all of which are usually 
signs of a care orientation. But in the corporate world, 
these are often subordinated to one's role obligations in 
the corporation. 
The theory explored here is that some managers are 
basically care oriented in their moral reasoning, but in the 
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work environment they are required or trained to use justice 
reasoning even in conflicts which arise from care concerns. 
This differs from an interpretation which suggests that the 
managers and other professionals are justice oriented 
people, by nature, by self-selection, or by early training. 
From this study it is not clear which of these theories more 
accurately describes the sample. While the work environment 
theory has some face validity, it is important to guard 
against interpretation of results in ways that merely 
explain away inconsistencies with past findings, in an 
unwillingness to seriously question the hypotheses. 
Summary of the Hypotheses-Testing 
In summary the major quantitative findings were: 
1. One third of the participants said they had never 
faced a moral conflict at work. There were no strong 
demographic characteristics identified with this group. 
2. All but one of the participants who described a 
moral conflict at work did so with primarily rights 
reasoning. The one exception was a male who used primarily 
care reasoning. 
3. There were no significant correlations between the 
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demographic variables and the strength of the rights 
orientation. 
Conflicts With Whom About What? 
One of the most interesting patterns which emerged 
during the course of the interviews was with whom the 
described conflicts occurred. As the conflicts were 
examined and grouped on that basis, it was clear that there 
were also patterns in the kinds of conflicts. Although the 
specific issues varied widely, there were several repeated 
themes. These patterns and themes are presented here. 
Twenty-seven conflicts were described in the sample of 
forty participants. The conflicts were between the 
participant and a superior, a subordinate, or the rules of 
the organization in the following number of cases: 
Conflicts With: 
Superiors: 15 
Subordinates: 7 
Org Rules: 5 
The conflicts with superiors were primarily conflicts 
between what the respondent thought was right and consistent 
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with organizational standards and goals, and what the 
superior was directing the respondent to do. These were 
conflicts between the respondent’s own sense of the job and 
others’ directives. Twelve of the fifteen conflicts with 
superiors are focused on these types of issues. These 
include such examples as being told to play down a known 
health hazard of a product, directions to fire a high 
performing employee for reasons other than work-related 
issues, an immediate superior withdrawing his commitment to 
a project that was supported by higher management, being 
directed to install a computer system before it is fully 
operative, developing a product for export in order to 
illegally subvert the import laws of another , country. 
In all of these instances the participants related 
concerns about what they felt was the right thing to do in 
terms of Steng’s standards. Their perception was that the 
organizational standards were higher than those exhibited by 
their superior, and in many cases they took a stand for the 
organizational standards against their boss. However the 
risks of this approach were clear. Sometimes the 
participant incurred a significant personal cost by taking 
this stand, while in other cases, the superior concurred 
with the decision. 
A smaller subset (4) of the conflicts with superiors 
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focus on how the individual respondent was treated by the 
superior. These posed problems about what was right and 
fair for oneself in the face of perceived unfair treatment. 
These include such examples as being treated like a 
"lackey", and fighting for a promotion. 
The conflicts with subordinates were not direct 
conflicts with individuals as much as internal struggles 
about how to be a good supervisor, how to "do right" by 
subordinates in particular instances. Examples of these 
conflicts were how to settle a grievance fairly, whether to 
encourage an employee to apply for a job posting in another 
department and risk losing his contribution within the 
respondent’s own department, how to do an honest performance 
appraisal without seriously hurting an unstable employee. 
The third and smallest grouping of conflicts were 
between the individual's own standards and Steng's 
organizational rules. These included instances of knowing 
people who were targeted for lay-off and wanting to warn 
them or help them ahead of time, negotiating a contract with 
techniques that clashed with personal values, deciding 
whether to stop a production line due to discrepant parts or 
to ship them as they were. These managers clearly 
understood the company policies and felt strongly about 
their loyalty and obligations as organizational members, but 
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were aware that if they were operating as individuals they 
would make different choices. 
These conflicts can be restated as conflicts about the 
roles the participants were playing at work and their 
obligations within those roles. Thus the types of conflicts 
experienced could be redescribed as conflicts about; 
The role of subordinate; 15 
The role of superior; 7 
The role of organizational member; 5 
The participants were specifically asked about moral 
conflicts in their work lives, so it is not surprising that 
the issues they raised can be classified into the different 
roles the participants take on at work. The dilemmas come 
into being through the hierarchy of responsibility and 
authority. However it is clear that certain roles involve 
significantly more moral conflicts than others. The high 
number of conflicts related to the role of the subordinate 
may explain why there was not a significant difference in 
the occurrence of moral conflicts between managers and 
non-management professionals. Since the conflicts occur 
more often with those above than with those below, it is not 
terribly important who is below. However for managers with 
conflicts with superiors, there was the additional 
consideration of the effects of the conflicts on their 
83 
subordinates. 
While acknowledging the threats to reliability due to 
the self-selection of the participants and the self-report 
method of the interviews, it is nonetheless interesting to 
examine the moral tone evidenced in the conflicts. The 
largest number of them focus on what they think would be 
best for the organization, despite conflicting directives 
from their boss. The next group revolve around how to be a 
good manager. The third group considers how to maintain 
their obligation to the organization and also maintain their 
own values. It’s a collection of conflicts in which the 
organization fares quite well. These managers and staff 
people are acting out a strong commitment to Steng and the 
values it represents. 
Conceptions of Morality 
The participants' practical conceptions of morality can 
be found in their dilemmas. In analyzing ethical dilemmas 
it is useful to distinguish between moral rules and moral 
ideals (Hennessey and Gert, 1985). The major theme 
throughout these dilemma discussions was a concern for 
duty. The important moral rule was duty to the organization 
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or to a boss. This was seen in terms of expected loyalty, 
obedience, corporate political games, and maintaining the 
hierarchical structure. The moral obligation of duty often 
took precedence over other moral rules (such as do not 
deceive in a contract negotiation), and restrained 
individuals from acting on the basis of their own moral 
ideals (such as prevent trauma of job loss). Future 
research would do well to probe the moral implications of 
the concept of duty, and its relationship to other moral 
obligations. 
Immediately following the questions about a moral 
conflict situation, the participants were asked "What does 
morality mean to you?". Many people grimaced and struggled 
with putting words to feelings that hadn’t been articulated 
before. Initial responses included many statements about 
doing what’s right, what’s comfortable, what feels right, 
being able to look at oneself in the mirror, instinctively 
knowing what’s right, a certain feeling. When asked to be 
more specific ("What are those feelings based on? What are 
some of those things that feel right?"), participants 
offered an interesting range of specific rules. Common ones 
included: 
Laws 
Company Rules 
The Golden Rule 
Never Tell Lies 
Honesty 
Loyalty 
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By the Book 
Ten Commandments 
Trust 
Don’t Steal Time 
In addition there were work-related elaborations which 
gave evidence of careful thought and individual sincerity of 
response: 
Giving people their dignity. 
Truthful about others’ performance. 
Not abusing one’s position of authority. 
Not being prejudiced. 
Helping others. 
Loving others. 
Contributing to society. 
Striving to be professional. 
Fair work for fair wages. 
Consider impact of own actions on others. 
Not benefiting self at others’ expense. 
Integrity to one’s own values. 
Planning for success. 
A balance that allows us to survive as a species. 
These brief definitions reflect wide-ranging concerns 
including justice, honesty, the social good, caring for 
others, role fulfillment, the organizational good, and 
survival. Taking these given definitions into account, the 
participants’ conceptions of morality are certainly broader 
than duty within their work organization. Even if these are 
all viewed from a perspective within the organization, they 
significantly expand the repertoire of moral behavior beyond 
those discussed in the conflict sections. Further research 
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is required to pursue the relationship between how 
individuals define morality in real life dilemmas and how 
they define it in words. 
Professional versus Personal Morality 
The final question to be addressed is that which asked 
"Does professional morality differ from personal morality 
for you?" All but six respondents replied in the negative. 
Many answered with a firm "No" with no further explanation. 
Many others expressed concern at the possibility of such a 
separation in values. These were emphatic statements about 
the importance of integrating one’s life and values. Some 
examples follow: 
You can’t have one set of principles from 8-5 and 
another set from 5-8. 
What’s moral is moral regardless of location. 
There’s no difference whether I’m inside these 
walls or at home. 
Your worlds overlap. 
I don’t go through a different thought process 
just because I’m wearing a three piece suit. 
If our morality differed from professional to 
personal, we’d have schizoid personalities. 
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Most participants strongly believed that their personal 
and professional morality were the same. Those who stated 
that they saw a difference in their behavior gave 
interesting explanations: 
At work I am more on guard not to speak out of 
anger. 
make more compromises professionally than I do 
personally. I think that’s flexibility, survival, if 
you will. 
There are times when I pull some devious little 
tricks here and there, but only because I have to. 
There’s a reality that business is competitive and you 
have to be willing to get as much as you can for 
yourself . 
What you feel for yourself outside of the business 
world doesn’t necessarily have to be the same thing 
that you portray at work. 
There’s not a lot of room left to weigh in the 
human portion of the emotion, the human warmth. You 
seem to be driven more by results, the bottom line. 
Several people reported that they made an effort not to 
make personal and professional moral judgements on a 
different basis, but they felt that many other managers did 
make a clear separation. This is an interesting perception 
given the overwhelming number (85%) of participants who 
maintained that their moral values were the same in both 
settings. There may be a bias due to the self-selection of 
the sample. Those who agreed to participate in a study of 
moral reasoning at work may be people who think about their 
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moral choices in an active way and intentionally integrate 
their moral values within the different spheres of their 
lives. 
The problem may also arise from the self-report nature 
of the data. People may believe that their morality doesn’t 
vary from their personal environment to their work 
environment, or they believe that it is important to say 
that their morality doesn't vary even if it sometimes does. 
But many people also clearly believe that in business the 
practiced norm is two different standards. It was 
frequently pointed out that "other people" have two 
different operating moral standards. Whether the 
participants were being truthful or not, it was clearly 
important for them to believe and present themselves as 
having a sense of morality that was consistent in their 
personal and professional lives. 
One additional interpretation of the self-perceived 
consistency may be appropriate for the type of moral 
reasoning used by the Steng managers and non-management 
professionals. In the introduction justice reasoning was 
described as an approach grounded in the theories of Kant 
and Rawls. It is primarily a deontological view of moral 
philosophy. There are clear rules and obligations that 
define moral behavior. In the Steng environment these 
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obligations, whether they be obligations to the company, to 
subordinates, superiors, or to oneself, are the overriding 
concerns in the moral conflicts which arise for managers and 
professionals. One of the main tenets of deontology is that 
these rules are applied consistently, they are not highly 
responsive to situations or consequences. 
If participants had used more care reasoning, which is 
responsive to individual needs and situations, there may 
have been greater evidence of distinctions between personal 
and professional morality. Several of the explanations 
given for why these value sets may differ relate to the care 
considerations: emotional expression, weighing the human 
factor, social concerns for others. Perhaps it is this care 
portion of most people's sense of morality which varies with 
different environments, while the justice and rules portion 
of individual morality remains more consistent throughout 
the different roles people play. Justice is about equal 
treatment and commitment to principles of fairness. It is 
this definition of morality, rather than that of care and 
response, which evokes the insistence on consistency in 
application . 
As alluded to in the earlier discussion of Kohlberg, it 
has been suggested that care-type concerns tend to occur 
more in personal settings, while justice-type concerns are 
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the focus of moral issues in professional arenas (Kohlberg 
and Kramer, 1969; Gilligan, 1982). The findings reported 
here do not necessarily indicate such a separation. While 
the justice reasoning dominated the discussion of 
work-related moral conflicts in these interviews, there were 
also strong considerations of care responsibilities. Care 
is articulated and brought into the workplace. It is a 
clear concern. However it is not, in most cases, the 
controlling concern, or it is not articulated as such. 
These are brief interpretations of the data gathered. 
They suggest more probing and research are required. 
Additional questions in the interview gathered information 
on self-description, definitions of success, types of 
relationships built at work, and definitions of 
responsibility. These were not directly related to the 
hypotheses tested in this paper. However, the data from 
these questions, to be reported elsewhere, may cast some 
additional light on the findings discussed here. 
CHAPTER V 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Implications For Theory 
The implications of the research data can be seen in 
the context of the theoretical background from which it 
emerged. In this section the theories of moral agency and 
moral development will be reassessed in light of the 
empirical findings. While the study reported here needs to 
be broadened in order to make significant claims about the 
moral reasoning of managers in general, these data provide 
limited support for existing theories of moral 
responsibility in organizations. 
Moral Agency. The findings are not inconsistent with 
Goodpaster and Matthew's theory of moral projection and the 
"Hand of Management" (Goodpaster and Matthews, 1982). Their 
arguments focus on the philosophical logic of attributing 
responsibility to both organizations and individuals. The 
research conducted here focused on individual decisions 
rather than organizational decisions or policies. As such 
it doesn't directly support or contradict Goodpaster and 
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Matthew's projected "thought process of the organization". 
However it does support their conclusion that moral 
responsibility can properly be attributed to both 
individuals and organizations. It is clear from the 
interview data that individuals do make moral choices at 
work based on consideration of both their own values and the 
organizational demands. It is also evident that the 
organization via its managers and its official policies 
makes decisions that have moral implications within and 
outside the firm. The data point to a significant 
organizational influence on the decision making process. 
This encourages the attribution of some moral responsibility 
to the organization and its contextual pressures on the 
individual . 
The data contradict DeGeorge's Organizational View and 
support the Moralistic View (DeGeorge, 1981). The 
individuals at Steng did not speak as if they were acting 
only as agents of the corporation. They did make decisions 
as private persons with individual values and goals. In 
many cases they had incorporated the good of the 
organization into their value system but their articulated 
considerations in resolving conflicts indicated private 
struggles and concerns. 
Examples of this were the conflicts about whether to 
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notify employees who were scheduled to be laid off, earlier 
than company policy specified, so that they might start 
their job search. This was clearly not in the company’s 
interest but it was a personal value which came into 
consideration. The fact that both managers who expressed 
concern about this issue resolved it in a way which did not 
violate Steng policy is important to the organization and 
bespeaks their commitment to the organization, but it does 
not negate the role of their personal morality in the 
workplace. In a strong team culture, individuals may be 
persuaded to decide on what’s best for the company, but for 
many that final choice comes after weighing the individual 
costs and personal integrity. As the moralistic view 
suggests, individuals working on behalf of the organization 
do not cease to be moral agents by virtue of their 
professional roles. 
French’s Corporate Internal Decision (CID) Structure 
(French, 1979) is a philosophically creative theory but it 
suffers in light of the empirical data. According to French 
a decision is an intentional corporate decision if 1) it is 
made in accordance with the corporate chart, e.g. the 
individual is acting within her or his proper role and 
authority, and 2) if the decision is consistent with 
corporate policy. In practice however, two individuals may 
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act within their corporate authority and act consistently 
with their interpretation of corporate policy and yet their 
decisions may be in conflict with each other. There are too 
many conflicting organizational policies and positions of 
authority for this structure to work smoothly. The purpose 
of defining corporate intention is to redescribe individual 
actions as corporate actions and thereby ascribe moral 
responsibility to the organization. 
The findings do not in any way disprove French's 
fundamental argument that an organization can be treated as 
a moral agent. To the contrary, the data suggest a strong 
organizational influence. But in studying the types of 
conflicts which were related in the interviews, and the high 
percentage of conflicts which occurred with superiors, the 
CID structure appears to be too simplistic to functionally 
describe the organizational intention. For example, a 
manager said he faced a moral conflict in deciding whether 
to pursue a research project he believed to have the support 
of upper management, despite directives from his immediate 
boss to drop the project. Both the manager and his boss 
were acting on what they believed were the best interests of 
the company. Company policy can not be so specific that it 
covers every situation. 
Many decisions are delegated to middle and lower 
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managers. Their subordinates may disagree with the 
consistency of their decisions. Or these delegated 
decisions may be inconsistent horizontally throughout the 
firm. There is not a simple way of declaring some of these 
decisions to be the intention of the corporation and others 
not. This is a structural and practical disagreement with 
French’s justifying argument. Although it is fundamental to 
his position, it is not a contradiction of his final 
conclusion about moral agency. 
Velasquez argues in favor of assigning all moral 
responsibility to the individual actors, and eliminating the 
organization from consideration as a moral agent (1983). As 
elaborated above, the data point to a strong organizational 
influence on the individual decision makers. The 
participants did bring their own values into consideration 
in many cases but the dominant moral rule of the conflict 
discussions was duty to the organization. The organization 
demands, fosters, and rewards this consideration. Velasquez 
does not deny ’’corporate acts”, only ’’corporate moral 
responsibility”. But if corporate acts precipitate moral 
choices by individual corporate members, and those choices 
are made by weighing the corporate good more heavily than 
individual values, then it seems that the organization which 
encourages this decision should be at least partially 
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responsible. 
The data do not significantly alter the position taken 
on moral agency at the outset of the research. They do 
emphasize more strongly the role of the organization, and 
the perceived obligations of the individual within the 
organization, as components in the moral reasoning process 
of managers. The data imply that moral responsibility for 
decisions should be attributed both to individual decision 
makers and to the organization as a whole which provides a 
forceful context in which moral decisions are made. 
Moral Development. The data presented here do not 
support Gilligan's thesis (1982) that the two modes of moral 
reasoning, justice and care, are gender related. In the 
Steng corporate setting those differences were not in 
evidence. This may indicate that if such gender differences 
do exist in the general population, they are not so deeply 
ingrained that they cannot be adapted or altered to fit the 
requirements of a strong organizational culture. While 
Gilligan suggests that the socialization process of infants 
and children results in these differing moral orientations, 
it appears that the different modes of reasoning are 
learnable later in life in response to environmental 
stimuli. 
The use of justice and care considerations in moral 
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conflicts may be strongly context related. The context may 
be more influential than gender in determining the moral 
orientation. The subjects of Gilligan’s hypothesis building 
study were facing abortion decisions. The concerns they 
discussed were related to their lives and the interconnected 
responsibilities. As the real-life dilemma interview was 
used more broadly, the range of dilemmas discussed was also 
broadened. Therefore, what people chose to describe as a 
moral conflict was wide open. The context was not a limited 
one. 
In contrast, the research presented here limited the 
realm of moral dilemmas to the Steng workplace. Other work 
environments may have dramatically different cultures and 
patterns of moral reasoning. In our limited sample, the 
Steng environment favored definition and resolution of moral 
dilemmas from the perspective of obligations, roles, rights, 
and duties. 
Many care considerations were voiced in the conflict 
descriptions and resolutions. They were not the dominant 
mode of moral reasoning among the women or the men 
interviewed, but they were distinguishable in the voiced 
concerns. In an important way the care orientation was 
visible in the data. Two aspects of this are worth noting. 
The first was in the personal conflicts mentioned by many of 
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the participants who did not feel they had faced moral 
conflicts at work. The nature of these conflicts were more 
directly related to responsibilities in their relationships 
with others. In addition to being described as alternatives 
to work-related conflicts, numerous personal conflicts were 
described by participants in addition to their work 
conflict. Although these conflicts were not coded, the 
presence of care considerations in them was high. 
Reconciling this with strong statements by participants that 
their personal and professional morality are the same, it 
might be concluded that the participants use the same 
standards and reasoning in approaching moral conflicts at 
home and at work, but they focus on different issues. 
Personal issues may be more care oriented while professional 
issues are related to the duties and obligations at work. 
The second way in which the care orientation was 
visible was in the explanatory comments of those who 
perceived a difference in their personal and professional 
morality. Several of these emphasized a shift to impersonal 
criteria within the workplace and an intentional disregard 
of the human element. Warmth, emotion, concern for others 
more than oneself, and feelings from outside of work are 
consciously not expressed. Reviewing the data this is 
obviously not true of everyone, but they were observations 
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articulated by those who felt a separation in their moral 
value systems. 
Further research is needed to determine whether the 
same individuals use different modes of moral reasoning in 
different settings. A future study should ask participants 
to describe two distinct conflicts, one personal and one 
professional. Only with this data on both environments 
could conclusions be made about individuals’ ability to use 
both modes selectively or in response to contextual 
demands. From the data presented here it is clear that most 
participants who experienced moral conflicts included some 
care considerations and some justice considerations in their 
evaluation and resolution of the dilemma. The predominance 
of the justice orientation raises interesting questions 
about the role of the organization in the decision making 
process, its responsibility in the moral decisions of 
managers, and the impact of the cultural environment on the 
operative mode of moral reasoning. 
Implications For Practice 
There are several important messages for top management 
in the data presented here. They can be taken directly from 
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the interviews by examining the situations which gave rise 
to the conflicts. These are not necessarily moral issues, 
but they may result in moral conflicts. The situations 
include the following. 
1. A manager talked about the dilemma of "discrepant 
parts." At what point is a small defect significant enough 
to justify the expense of shutting dov/n the line to redo the 
part? The assignment of responsibility for quality control 
and production quantity to the same person forces a 
prioritizing and compromising of one or the other. Without 
clear policy, or if the policy and reward system are 
contradictory, critical quality standards may be compromised 
in order to keep the production lines running. 
2. Standards set by top management must be more 
consistently followed by middle managers. A significant 
number of participants spoke of reporting clear policy 
violations to superiors only to receive the response: "Don't 
make trouble." Although nearly all of the individuals 
interviewed voiced strong support of top management goals, 
standards, and policies, many also expressed doubt about 
adherence to these standards and implementation of the 
policies by middle managers. 
k 
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3. Employees at all ranks should be allowed to "make 
trouble" in the short term. As some of the participants 
pointed out in reflecting on their experiences, reporting a 
violation of a company policy is sometimes seen as "making 
trouble." Without recognizing the potential for moral 
conflicts in the workplace and providing for the expression 
of such conflicts, top management unwittingly encourages 
disaffection among the various ranks of organizational 
members. If standards are set, but not enforced, the 
coherence of the organizational culture is weakened. Better 
enforcement of the standards is only a partial solution. In 
addition it must be acknowledged that complete control in a 
large organization is neither possible nor wholly 
desirable. A critical component in organizations, providing 
balance to top-down control, is an internal mechanism by 
which individuals can step outside the hierarchical order 
and voice concerns about organizational processes and 
decisions without incurring personal costs. 
4. Most participants want to feel that their personal 
and professional morality are the same, or at least not 
contradictory. This could be interpreted as a desire to 
incorporate personal values and standards into the 
workplace. At Steng employees are encouraged by brochures 
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and posters to treat the company as if it were their own and 
practice their highest standards. The data strongly 
indicate that organizational members want to carry that 
out. If an organization supports this approach, it must 
guard against contradictory messages and rewards which 
communicate an exclusive emphasis on the bottom line. 
Directions for Future Research 
Further Related Studies. The research presented here 
is an exploratory study of how managers define and reason 
about moral conflicts within the corporation. The study was 
limited to one organization and one level of management in 
order to isolate the demographic variables within the 
population. Further studies are needed to focus on other 
relevant variables. These might include: comparing the 
conflicts faced and the reasoning used at different levels 
within an organization; assessing the effects of contrasting 
organizational cultures between different divisions or 
distinct firms; designing a comparative study between profit 
and not-for-profit organizations; comparing the moral 
reasoning evidenced in different professions, such as in a 
law firm or a hospital, with those of an industrial 
A 
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manufacturing firm. All of these offer potential 
contributions to understanding the influences on moral 
decision makers. 
Methodological Refinements. In coding the interviews, 
it became clear that the coding system had been devised for 
interpreting data from a population of non-affiliated 
individual persons. In an organizational setting the key 
terms "self" and "other" take on multiple meanings, and 
those meanings are not always consistent with the meanings 
attributed to them in the coding scheme. A moral conflict 
may arise between what is good for "self" and what is good 
for "other," but "self" in this corporate setting might be 
the individual, the immediate department, or the 
organization as a whole; and "other" could range from an 
employee, to a boss, another department, another 
organization, a supplier, or, as in one dilemma discussion, 
a developing country. With this range of meanings it is 
hard to apply the concepts of "care for other" and 
"responding to another in their terms" consistently with the 
meaning of the individual "other" described in the coding 
scheme. 
This range of relationships and interactions also sheds 
light on why there were almost no care-oriented dilemmas. 
It is difficult in the midst of business decisions to evoke 
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the kind of concern that one might have for another 
individual and direct that toward a rival business or even a 
corporate customer. Honesty, fairness, and justice can be 
applied in these situations more readily than concern for 
feelings. The "other" might not have any feelings. 
Many managerial decisions relate to intercorporate 
deals. In this setting the conception of care could be 
understood as a certain perspective towards others in a 
broader sense. Ways of doing business can be described as 
caring, but it is rare that they are expressed in those 
terms. In some of the interviews, managers voiced caring 
policies such as not chiseling a supplier on prices, always 
trying to recognize the needs of the other participants in 
contract negotiations, not cutting off support to 
customers. The coding scheme in its current form classifies 
caring rules as rules, and therefore in the justice 
category. This aspect may need to be reconsidered. 
Adaptations in the methodology could be made to reflect the 
vocabulary of organizational actions and processes. The 
Lyons coding scheme is the best of few available instruments 
to analyze how individuals reason about moral conflicts. 
Improvements on the scheme should aim to decrease learning 
time and time for achievement of coder reliability. In 
order for the field studies of moral reasoning to 
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significantly increase knowledge, more instruments are 
needed. Rigorous research demands reliable, comparable 
instruments that can be used to cross-validate and enhance 
findings from any one instrument. 
Theoretical Relevance of the Data. Building on the 
findings with other variables and measures are important 
empirical steps to be undertaken. But the data presented 
here are conceptually relevant to a number of theories and 
hypotheses which invite exploration. Donaldson (1982) 
offers a social contract theory which delineates the 
responsibilities between the corporate organization and its 
community. He justifies the concept of a social contract 
for productive organizations and suggests certain minimal 
prima facie benefits that should accrue to the workers as 
the internal community, as well as those which should accrue 
to the the external community. This aspect of the social 
contract, between the organization and its members, could be 
enlarged and more clearly specified drawing on the 
information in the conflict interviews. What demands and 
expectations do managers and workers have of the corporation 
for whom they work? What concerns might be generalized into 
policies and mutual commitments? How feasible are theories 
of corporate responsibility and what are the stumbling 
blocks? These questions could be directly addressed by the 
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data, providing refinements and empirical support for the 
social contract theory. 
Hennessey and Gert (1985) distinguish between moral 
rules and moral ideals in examining dilemmas in the 
workplace. This distinction could be drawn upon to analyze 
the data from a different perspective. It would be useful 
to determine which considerations were articulated as moral 
rules and which were seen as moral ideals within the 
corporate arena. Hennessey and Gert have suggested ten 
moral rules. Somewhat overlapping with the ten 
commandments, these are characterized by their non-active 
nature. One can fulfill these moral rules by not doing 
anything. The moral ideals, on the other hand, demand 
initiative and action to be fulfilled. Several aspects of 
this theory are relevant to the data. What are the dominant 
moral rules within the organizational setting? Are moral 
ideals acted upon or encouraged within the organization? 
Does the organization want moral idealism in its managers? 
Also, do the moral rules and ideals articulated by the 
participants validate the moral rules and ideals suggested 
by Hennessey and Gert? Some of these questions have been 
briefly considered in Chapter IV. More in depth analysis 
would be fruitful. 
There are also relevant connections to be made in the 
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broader fields of organization behavior and organization 
theory. In particular motivation in organizations could be 
studied from the perspective of the effects of moral 
conflicts at work on the performance and contribution of 
individual workers/managers who experience such conflicts. 
Are there alienating or team-building effects as a result of 
these experiences? Leadership could be approached from the 
question of what kinds of moral reasoning are used by 
individuals who move into leadership positions? How do 
their moral values influence subordinates? What is their 
view of the question of moral agency? Do they distinguish 
between themselves and the corporation in terms of who bears 
moral responsibility? 
Clearly, there are many next steps to be taken. The 
findings presented in this study offer potential bridges to 
research in management, moral philosophy, and moral 
development. These bridges must be constructed in order to 
understand the complexity of moral thinking in contemporary 
institutions. 
Reflections and Observations 
For the field of business ethics, this research is a 
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strong urging to consider and recognize the range of moral 
sense-making within corporations. Much of the prior 
research has focused on the responsibility of the 
organization to its external constituencies. There is also 
a great need to articulate the mutual responsibility within 
organizations and the moral conflicts that arise in routine 
operations and decisions. Occasionally moral dilemmas occur 
with national or global implications, giving rise to scandal 
and scrutiny. But for many managers there are difficult 
moral issues occurring in the daily processes of 
organizational life. 
In order to clarify legal implications and 
philosophical explanations the question of moral agency will 
continue to be debated. However, the interview data stress 
the importance of considering the individual as the unit of 
analysis. In doing so, we do not deny the role of the 
organization and its contribution to moral responsibility. 
But the individuals in the firm are always the decision 
makers, responding to the pressures of organizational 
survival as well as the internal demands of personal 
integrity, satisfaction, and need. One message found in the 
interviews was that these managers and other professionals 
take their roles and commitments to the organization very 
seriously. This attitude firmly shapes their moral 
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choices. 
The role obligations of the individual within the 
corporation are not so all encompassing that the individual 
loses her or his own values and moral standards. These are 
brought into the workplace and applied, perhaps with 
adaptations to professional demands. It is important to 
many that their personal and professional moral values be 
integrated into one coherent system. Therefore it should be 
important to productive organizations that the voices of 
moral concern be heard within the workplace. These 
collective voices should be drawn upon as a collective 
conscience, a resource to strengthen the organization. As 
with an individual conscience, this voice of concern can 
benefit and protect the organization if heeded, and drain 
the organization of its strength when it is disregarded. 
This collective conscience will provide guidance to the 
organization in determining the highest moral common 
denominator, to shape organizational decisions and 
policies. 
Looking at the small daily moral conflicts is a useful 
process. It highlights the stress point within the 
organization. Middle and upper management must find ways to 
monitor these conflicts and benefit from them, rather than 
denying that moral conflicts play a role in the life of 
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their managers. The weak points that are thus highlighted 
are weak not because of moral sensitivity, but because of 
the organization's demonstrated lack of willingness to 
respond in a constructive manner and change the causes of 
the situation. 
How would this monitoring be done? The interview 
research conducted here is private and confidential. The 
data can not be turned over to top management in its 
entirety. There are several possible first steps. Top 
management should begin to recognize and talk about moral 
conflicts in a positive way, openly within the corporation, 
to pave the way for increased awareness and communication. 
An ombudsperson could be established to listen 
confidentially to significant issues of moral conflict and 
communicate them in terms that relate to policy and 
personnel standards. Internal grievance systems must be 
established to air these conflicts without risk of high 
personal cost or alienation. For the minor conflicts, 
managers must learn how to ask about them. As with other 
aspects of good management, understanding the moral concerns 
of those below and above is a process which demands ongoing 
effort and offers only intermittent rewards. But the 
awareness of those surrounding the individual manager that 
moral values are something that can be discussed is a 
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significant contribution to the work environment. 
Each individual's conception of morality is a rich 
fabric of perceptions, experiences, values, and needs. The 
interview research presented here is one way of gathering 
and comparing many tapestries. The use of considerations in 
the coding process enables a researcher to pull apart a few 
of the different threads and examine their unique textures. 
Individual threads may also be seen over time with careful 
observation. But to understand moral reasoning the threads 
must be seen within the complexity of the entire design. 
The strength of each thread is dependent on that of many 
others. As with any fabric put to good use, the value of 
moral fabric lies not only in its beauty and elegance, but 
in its flexibility and durability as well. 
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RESEARCH AGREEMENT 
This is a study of reasoning and decision making in 
organizations. Participation will take about an hour and a 
half of your time. There are two major parts to this 
interview during which you will be asked: 
1. To describe the way you think about making choices 
and about yourself. 
2. To discuss a dilemma that actually happened to you 
in your work life. 
The entire interview consists of questions like these. 
There are no hidden or experimental treatments and no known 
risks or discomforts involved beyond the possibility that 
some of the questions may arouse strong opinions or remind 
you of important emotional experiences. 
By answering these questions you will be helping us 
investigate and understand the ways that people of a wide 
range of ages and backgrounds reason about moral dilemmas at 
work and make decisions about them. 
If you have any questions, now or at any time, please 
feel free to ask me. If at any time you feel unable or 
unwilling to contine you are free to withdraw your consent 
and stop the interview and your participation. 
The interview will be tape recorded but your 
confidentiality will be protected in the following ways: No 
identifying information will appear on the transcript of the 
tape. All names, places, etc. will be deleted during 
transcription. Access to this interview will be limited to 
the people conducting this research. Short excerpts from 
this interview may be used in academic presentations or in 
published reports of this research, but these will be 
disguised to insure unrecognizability. If any portion of 
this interview is to be used in an article, academic 
presentation, or report, you will be shown the portion used 
to make sure it has been adequately disguised. 
I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE STATEMENTS LISTED ABOVE AND I 
AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
name date 
I DO NOT AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
name 
APPENDIX B 
THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
114 
115 
THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
I. Introduction 
Looking back over the past year at work, what stays with 
y ou ? 
II. Self-Concept 
Having talked briefly about your work life in the past year, 
now I would like to ask you how you think about yourself. 
1. How would you describe yourself to yourself? 
2. Is the way you see yourself now different from the 
way you saw yourself in the past? How? What led to the 
change ? 
III. Moral Conflict and Choice 
All people have had the experience of being in situations 
where they had to make a decision but weren’t sure what was 
the right thing to do. 
1. Have you ever faced a moral dilemma in your work 
life? or Have you ever been in a situation at work where you 
faced a moral conflict and had to make a decision but you 
weren’t sure what was the right thing to do? 
Construction of the Problem 
1. What was the situation? 
2. What was the conflict for you in that situation? 
Resolution of the Problem 
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1. In thinking about what to do, what did you 
consider? Why? Anything else? Any other things you 
considered in trying to decide what to do? 
The Decision/Choice 
1. What did you decide to do? 
2. What happened? 
Evaluation of the Resolution 
1. Do you think that was the right thing to do? 
Why/Why not? 
2. (If it was a while ago) When you think back about 
the decision now, do you think about it in a different way? 
How? What led to the change? 
3. Did you consider this situation you’ve described as 
a moral problem? 
Concept of Morality 
1. What does morality mean to you? 
2. Does professional morality differ from personal 
morality for you? 
3. What makes something a moral problem for you? 
4. What does responsibility mean to you? 
5. When responsibility to oneself and to others 
conflict, how should one choose? 
6. Have you ever felt especially responsible for 
upholding the organization’s rules or standards? 
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7. Are there times when you feel that your moral 
standards are different from the corporation’s standards or 
expectations of behavior? 
8, When responsibilty to oneself and to the 
organization conflict, how should one choose? 
IV. Relationships 
1. Can you tell me about a relationship that has been 
important in your professional life? 
2. What about the relationship makes it important? 
3. Has that relationship changed over time? In what 
ways? What led to the change? 
4. Do you (or did you) and (this person) ever 
disagree? Do you voice your disagreement? Why? Why not? 
5. Do you and (this person) depend on each other? 
What does dependence mean to you? 
What does independence mean to you? 
V. Success 
At the beginning of this interview I asked you about how you 
see yourself now, in the present. Now I want to ask: 
1. What will you need to have done in order to see 
yourself and your life as successful? 
2. Does being successful in your life mean something 
different to you now, at this stage in your career, than it 
used to? What do you think led to those changes? 
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THE PILOT STUDY 
A pilot study was conducted at a medium size utility 
company. The purpose was to test the interview questions, 
the interview technique, and the response of participants to 
the taping of the interviews. In addition the author was 
able to practice coding the dilemmas with these interviews. 
In this preliminary study six individuals selected by 
the personnel department were interviewed. They ranged from 
a plant maintenance supervisor to a senior vice-president. 
They included four men and two women. In the process of 
these interviews the author learned the importance of 
putting the tape recorder on record instead of on play, 
wording the questions the same way consistently, listening 
for general statements and asking for more precise 
explanations, not conducting more than two or three 
interviews a day, and the difficulty of not letting the 
interview turn into a discussion. 
The participants in the pilot study differed from the 
Steng participants in that they were not selected by a 
random sample, and they were managers from several different 
levels within the organization. The responses from this 
broader range helped in the design of the Steng study. 
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TESTS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES FOR INDEPENDENCE 
Note: Only the variables of the conflict group were used in 
these tests. 
TABLE 11 
AGE OF PARTICIPANTS AND YEARS AT STENG 
Pearson’s Correlation: r = .384 
p= .038 
TABLE 12 
AGE OF FEMALES AND AGE OF MALES 
Mean S.D. 
Females 38.5 6.3 
(N=13) 
Males 46.3 7.2 
(N=14) 
t(24)= -3.01, p= .006 
TABLE 13 
AGE OF MANAGERS AND AGE OF NON-MANAGERS 
Mean S.D. 
Managers 43.1 7.6 
(N=16) 
Non-Managers 41.5 8.3 
(N=ll) 
t(20)= .524, p= .61 
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TABLE 14 
FEMALES AND MALES WITH YEARS AT STENG 
Mean S.D. 
Females 11.2 3.8 
(N=13) 
Males 16.4 3.8 
(N=14) 
t(24)= -3.594, p= .002 
TABLE 15 
MANAGERS AND NON- -MANAGERS WITH YEARS AT STENG 
Mean S.D • 
Managers 14.8 5.0 
(N=16) 
Non-Managers 12.5 3.7 
(N = ll) 
t(24)= 1.348, p= .187 
TABLE 16 
MALES AND FEMALES WITH RELIGION 
Protestant Catholic No Religion Totals 
Males 6 7 1 14 
Females 8 1 3 12 
Totals 14 8 4 26 
Df= 2 Chi-square= 5.67: Not Significant 
Note: Four cells with expected frequencies less than 5 - see 
footnote at end of appendix. 
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TABLE 17 
MANAGERS AND NON-MANAGERS WITH RELIGION 
Protestant 
Managers 7 
Catholic 
5 
No Religion 
3 
Totals 
15 
Non-Managers 7 3 1 11 
Totals 14 8 4 26 
Df= 2 Chi-square= .91: Not Significant 
Note: Four cells with expected frequencies less than 5 - see 
footnote at end of appendix. 
TABLE 18 
MALES AND FEMALES WITH MANAGERS AND NON-MANAGERS 
Managers Non-Managers Totals 
Males 10 4 14 
Females 6 7 13 
Totals 16 11 27 
Df= 1 Chi-square= 1.78: Not Significant 
TABLE 19 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: AGE WITH RELIGION 
Source of SS DF MS F P 
Variation: 
Religion 83.8 2 41.9 
Residual 1214.4 22 55.2 
Total 1298.2 24 .76 N.S 
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TABLE 20 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: YEARS AT STENG WITH RELIGION 
Source of 
Variation: 
SS DF MS F p 
Religion 46.5 2 23.2 
Residual 468.1 23 20.4 
Total 514.6 25 1.14 N.S 
1. With contingency tables with df greater than 1, the 
chi-square test may by used if fewer than 20 per cent of the 
cells have an expected frequency of less than 5 and if no 
cell has an expected frequency of less than 1. If these 
requirements are not met by the data in their original form, 
adjacent categories must be combined in order to increase 
the expected frequencies in the various cells. Only when 
these requirements are met can the chi-square test be 
meaningfully applied (Siegel, 1956). Thus in tables 6, 16, 
and 17 the chi-square test would be meaningful only if the 
religious groups of Catholic and No Religion were combined 
to increase the expected frequencies. Since this would 
render the religious groups meaningless, this was not done. 
Therefore these tables can be used only for a visual 
representation of the frequencies of the groups. The 
chi-squares given are not meaningful due to the limitations 
of the sample size. 
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MYERS-BRIGGS TYPE INDICATOR 
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) was administered 
to each participant following the moral dilemma interview. 
The MBTI is widely used in research, clinical, and 
consulting settings to determine the Jungian personality 
type of an individual. The instrument is a series of 125 
questions in which the respondent must select between two 
activities, two situations, two words, or two ways of 
feeling or being. Each question is to be answered with the 
choice that best represents the individual's preference. 
The interpretation of the selected answers is done with 
templates which enable the researcher to add up the number 
of answers in each type category. The types are determined 
by the individual's location on each of four continua. 
These four are: 
Extroversion - Introversion 
Sensing - Intuition 
Thinking - Feeling 
Judging - Perceptive 
The first letter of each word is used in naming the 
types, except for Intuition which is represented by N 
127 
instead of I. Thus, for example, an individual might be an 
ESTP, or an INFJ, or an ENTJ, and so on, through all of the 
sixteen types. An ESTP would have chosen answers indicating 
a personality that was more extroverted than introverted, 
more sensing than intuitive, more thinking than feeling, and 
more judging than perceptive. 
The definitions of these type words are provided in the 
interpretive manual (1976). They are used as follows: 
Extroversion; : You relate more easily to the outer 
world of people and things than to the 
inner world of ideas. 
Introversion: : You relate more easily to the inner 
world of ideas than to the outer world 
of people and things. 
Sensing: You would rather work with known facts 
than look for possibilities and 
relationships. 
Intuition: You would rather look for possibilities 
and relationships than work with known 
facts. 
Thinking: You base your judgements more on 
impersonal analysis and logic than on 
personal values. 
Feeling: You base your judgements more on 
personal values than on impersonal 
analysis and logic. 
Judging: You like a planned, decided, orderly way 
of life better than a flexible, 
spontaneous way. 
Perceptive: You like a flexible, spontaneous way of 
life better than a planned decided, 
orderly way. 
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Each type has preferences which affect work habits, 
types of relationships, patterns of reasoning, and many 
other aspects of an individual’s life. The Myers-Briggs 
instrument is an assessment tool which organizes and 
categorizes individual preferences. By grouping people into 
sixteen types, generalizations about those types can be made 
on the basis of similar preferences. Extensive research has 
shown that certain types are more prominent and successful 
in particular fields (Myers, 1980). 
The Myers-Briggs was administered in this study in 
order to test for a correlation between moral reasoning 
orientation and personality type as described by the 
Myers-Briggs. The methodological intention was to analyze 
the MBTI types of the respondents in the justice and care 
categories to determine whether certain types were related 
to one mode of moral reasoning or the other. This 
relationship between the Myers-Briggs types and moral 
orientation became infeasible to measure due to the lack of 
participants using a care orientation in their moral 
conflict situations. As the results in Chapter IV 
demonstrate the data revealed a predominant use of justice 
reasoning with little use of the care orientation. 
Therefore, in place of the intended correlational study with 
two distinct groups of participants, the strength of the 
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justice orientation of each respondent, e.g. the percentage 
of justice considerations used, was ranked on a continuum. 
This became the basis for the correlational test. 
Myers-Briggs Results 
The Myers-Briggs questionnaire was completed by each of 
the forty participants. The completed questionnaires were 
coded with the templates designed for interpreting the 
data. These templates tally the total scores for each 
participant in the eight categories and provide a resulting 
weighted score on each of the four continue. These scores 
are the determinants of the type. The assigned type 
represents the four categories in which the participant's 
preferences were the highest. 
In testing for correlation between the MBTI and the 
strength of justice reasoning, the scores in each of the 
eight different categories were tested individually with the 
percentages of justice reasoning. As shown in Table 21 all 
of the scores for extroversion were tested for correlation 
with percentage of justice considerations used, then all of 
the scores for introversion were tested for correlation with 
percentage of justice considerations used, and so on for 
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each category. Table 21 demonstrates the insignificance of 
the correlations between any of the MBTI variables and the 
strength of justice reasoning used by the Steng 
participants. Table 22 shows the mean scores and standard 
deviations for each of the eight individual type 
categories. 
TABLE 21 
PEARSON’S CORRELATIONS 
MYERS-BRIGGS SCORES WITH JUSTICE REASONING 
N = 27 
Extroversion with Justice Reasoning 
Introversion with Justice Reasoning 
Sensing with Justice Reasoning 
Intuition with Justice Reasoning 
Thinking with Justice Reasoning 
Feeling with Justice Reasoning 
Judging with Justice Reasoning 
Perceiving with Justice Reasoning 
r = 0.118 
r = -0.092 
r = 0.250 
r = -0.236 
r = 0.203 
r = -0.184 
r = -0.013 
r = 0.049 
TABLE 22 
MYERS-BRIGGS SCORES 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
N = 40 
Mean S.D. 
Introversion 13.1 6.4 
Extroversion 13.3 6.8 
Sensing 15.2 9.3 
Intuition 10.3 7.2 
Thinking 17 . 1 7.6 
Feeling 5.7 4.7 
Judging 17.5 7.3 
Perceptive 9.7 7.4 
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Although there seemed to be an intuitive relationship 
between some of the personality characteristics of the 
Myers-Briggs types and moral reasoning orientation, these 
relationships were not supported by the findings. However, 
it is clear from Table 22 that some personality 
characteristics measured by the Myers-Briggs are more 
prominent among the Steng participants than others. 
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